

China's view of its place in the world:

Nationalism and revolution in Chinese rhetoric of the 1960s

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work. ✓

All sources used have been acknowledged.

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Table of contents

Declaration.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Notes for readers.....	v
Introduction.....	1
Chapter I: Anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism	
1.1. Verbal attacks towards enemies and verbal encouratement towards allies.....	10
1.2. Criticism against the US over the Vietnam question.....	18
1.3. The importance of Chinese interests and security.....	24
1.4. Denunciation of the revisionist diplomacy.....	35
Chapter II: The Mao cult	
2.1. The highest peak of Marxism-Leninism.....	41
2.2. Export of Mao cult and Mao Zedong Thought as having global support	46
2.3. Denunciation of JCP "revisionists" and praise for Japanese Maoists.....	57
Chapter III: China's self-image	
3.1. The world revolution in the Chinese context.....	66
3.2. Peaceful image and militant image.....	71
3.3. The centre of the world revolution.....	77
Conclusion.....	85
Bibliography.....	87
Appendices.....	92

Notes for readers

Romanisation of Chinese

In this thesis, excluding direct quotations from other sources, Chinese personal names and place names are given in *pinyin*, with two exceptions: Hong Kong and *Ta-kung Pao*.

Translations

All translations are my own except when otherwise indicated. For translations done for this thesis, Chinese and Japanese original texts are given in "Appendix A" and "Appendix B," respectively.

Abbreviations

AJ: *Asahi Janaru* [*Asahi Journal*]

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DRV: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

DSJP: *Daily Summary of Japanese Press*

HQ: *Hongqi* [*Red Flag*]

JC: *Jinmin Chugoku* [*People's China*]

JCP: Japanese Communist Party

PR: *Peking Review*

RGP: *Red Guard Publications Part I--Newspapers--*

RMRB: *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*]

SCMM: *Selections from China Mainland Magazines*

Survey: *Survey of China Mainland Press*

US: United States

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Xinhua: Xinhua News Agency

Introduction

"The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" has been an interest of mine since I first visited Sichuan Province, China in 1990. There I happened to make friends with Chinese people who were involved in the Cultural Revolution as university students. One woman, in her late thirties, was an interpreter of Japanese at the Provincial government. Because she was very keen to learn about anything she was interested in, I once told her that I was very impressed with her. She replied, "I'm studying hard now, because I couldn't do so when I was a teenager." Then she said to me that it was all because of the "Cultural Revolution." Although I had heard the words "Cultural Revolution" before, I did not know about it in detail. Until then, to me, the "Cultural Revolution" was a historical event which no longer existed. I also became friends with people whose parents and relatives were still suffering from the mental damage that they received during the Revolution period. Their stories made me think about what the Cultural Revolution was.

I taught Japanese to Chinese middle-school teachers of English in the Sichuan Education Institute (*Sichuan Jiaoyu Xueyuan*). Some of my students visited me often to complain about how hopeless their future in their country was. It seemed to me as if they had no nationalistic sentiments. I thought that it might have been because it was just after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.

Then I came to wonder about what Chinese nationalism was during the Cultural Revolution. I thought the Chinese people's nationalistic sentiment of that period might in some ways affect that of today. However, to know the nationalistic feelings of all of the vast number of Chinese individuals during the Revolution period is impossible. As I was wondering how I could satisfy my curiosity, I came to be interested in China's image of its international status and role during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, my supervisor suggested to me that in order to observe Chinese nationalism during the Cultural Revolution period and the preceding years, I should examine what was being said in print by Chinese

people at the time and how the various voices in Chinese media (both official and non-official ones) expressed themselves about China's place in the world. By doing this, he said, I could not only see Chinese nationalist self-images of this period, but also find enough raw materials for the research. Therefore I decided to look at the rhetoric of Chinese nationalism in the 1960s, including the early phase of the Cultural Revolution.

I will refer briefly here to the early situation of the Cultural Revolution.¹ Lin Biao, the then Defence Minister of China, said that the Cultural Revolution (formally, the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution") aimed to develop proletarian ideology and the socialist system in accordance with Mao Zedong Thought, and to throw out bourgeois ideology and "revisionism."² It has been interpreted as a CCP Maoists' attempt to attack CCP "realists" who were claimed by the Maoists to be "revisionists." In the early stage of the Revolution (1966-68), radical activities of Red Guards, young Maoists, were significant throughout the whole country. They "analysed" Mao Zedong Thought and criticised "capitalists," "revisionists" and other "counterrevolutionaries" harshly. Their activities sometimes developed into violence.

Chinese nationalism in the 1960s has not often been closely examined from the perspective of the rhetoric of Chinese revolutionary propaganda. By contrast, much analysis has been done from the point of view of how China acted.³ Many researchers claimed that during the Cultural Revolution China concentrated instead on internal affairs.⁴ However, it was also true that China, as a "revolutionary" and "proletarian" country, always cared about how it would look abroad and its place in the world. For example, Chinese Maoists repeatedly argued that the "revisionist" leaders (such as Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi)

¹ Although there are several different ways of defining when the Cultural Revolution started, it is a common understanding that the Revolution began in 1966 and ended in 1976.

² Comrade Lin Biao's speech--At Peking's mass rally celebrating the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' in *PR* No.35, 26 August 1966, p.8.

³ For example, Van Ness, Peter, *Revolution and Chinese foreign policy--Peking's support for wars of national liberation* (University of California Press, London, 1970), pp.77-197., and Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen, *Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution* (Kegan Paul International, London, 1998), pp.66-115.

⁴ For example, Jonathan Unger (ed.), *Chinese Nationalism* (M.E.Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1996), p.xii.

"disgraced" the Chinese people through their friendly diplomacy with "reactionaries" during their trip to Indonesia in 1965.⁵

I will attempt to analyse nationalist and revolutionary expressions by Maoists in the Chinese Communist Party and by Red Guards as regards China's image and status in the world in the 1960s. By doing so I want to discuss Chinese points of view on their place in the world. Furthermore, I will demonstrate the influence of the CCP nationalist concern with improving China's international image with rhetorical strategies. I will look at revolutionary propaganda in official and non-official Chinese newspapers (such as *Renmin Ribao* and Red Guard newspapers, respectively) and magazines (such as *Hongqi*) to examine Chinese rhetorical strategies.

The then Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, exerted great personal power over the Cultural Revolution. John W. Lewis insists that Mao "subsumed his image under the party and lent it his authority."⁶ (It can be said that the CCP also used Mao's image for improvement of the Party image.) Indeed, whatever his intentions were, the image of Mao in Chinese publications rose dramatically and he was often referred to as the great leader not only of the Chinese people, but also of the revolutionary peoples of the world. This image coincided with China's self-image on the international stage; China "was the red fortress of the revolutionary peoples of the world."⁷ My hypothesis is that in revolutionary China in the 1960s, the rise of nationalism was stronger than enthusiasm for world revolution. It can be said that Chinese people, as they themselves claimed, tried to pursue the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle in a Marxist-Leninist way, but also that this was in order to build up the country's international image.

This research will focus only on the rhetoric of how Chinese Maoists tried to place China in the world. Even though Chinese foreign policy will be referred to in order to support the discussion, Chinese foreign policy itself is not the subject of this thesis. The

⁵'Yinni fandong pai mianqian de pa sigui [Cowardly ghosts in front of the Indonesian reactionary clique]' in *Waishi Fenglei*, 14 July 1967, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4394.

⁶Lewis, John W., 'Leader, commissar, and bureaucrat: the Chinese political system in the last days of the revolution' in Ho, Ping-ti and Tang Tsou (eds.), *China in crisis*, Vol.1, Book 2 (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968), p.465.

⁷'Beijing shi shijie geming renmin de hongse baolei [Beijing is the red fortress of the revolutionary peoples of the world]' in *RMRB*, 6 May 1967, p.5.

main international matters which will be included in this study are; Sino-Indian boundary confrontations (1962); the Sino-Soviet conflict (1963-); escalation of the Vietnam War (1965); establishment of diplomatic relations with France (1965); the split between the CCP and the Japanese Communist Party (1966); and Chinese riots against the British authorities over Hong Kong matters (1967).

I will mainly look at two Chinese official publications; *Renmin Ribao* and *Peking Review*. *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) was and still is the organ of the Chinese Communist Party. *Peking Review* (now titled *Beijing Review*) is a weekly magazine in English, published under the direction of the CCP. *Peking Review* often carries English versions of *Renmin Ribao* articles (especially editorials) mainly over international matters. It shows CCP points of view on external affairs to the rest of the world. Another Chinese official media source which I will use in this study is *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*). Although publication of the magazine was suspended from December 1967 to July 1968 (when the Cultural Revolution reached its peak), *Hongqi* has been the most important theoretical magazine of the CCP.⁸

All the Red Guard publications I will look at are Beijing-based. They are; *Dongfanghong* (*The East is Red*); *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*); *Hongwei Zhanbao* (*Red Guard War Bulletin*); *Hongweibao* (*Red Guard News*); *Waishi Fenglei* (*Foreign Affairs Storms*); *Waishi Hongqi* (*Foreign Affairs Red Flag*); *Pi Chen Zhanbao* (*Anti-Chen War Bulletin* <Chen=Foreign Minister Chen Yi>); *Renda Sanhong* (*People's University's Three Reds*) (combined issues with *Xin Beida*); and *Shoudu Hongweibing* (*Capital Red Guard*); *Xin Beida* (*New Beijing University*).

⁸During the suspension, *Hongqi* collaborated with *Renmin Ribao* and *Jiefang Junbao* (*Liberation Army Daily*).

Brief history of Sino-Soviet disputes

But before examining the rhetoric of the 1960s it is necessary to summarise very briefly how China's international policies developed in the 1960s, especially the increasingly hostile relationship with the USSR.

The Chinese Communist Party showed an increasing distrust of the Khrushchev-led USSR over the anti-imperialist struggle from the late 1950s onwards. In 1956, Khrushchev made a de-Stalinisation speech, which gave an unsatisfactory impression to Mao and other CCP leaders.⁹ In 1957, Mao visited Moscow and praised the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist camp, while skilfully putting pressure on Khrushchev not to emphasise a peaceful line towards imperialism.¹⁰ The Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew Soviet technicians and researchers from China in mid 1960.¹¹ However, no significant hostility was openly revealed between the two parties at the beginning of the 1960s.

In 1961, the president of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, Song Qingling, sent quite a friendly message on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty:

The Soviet people have given China great help in all fields in the past 11 years [...]. Such assistance will never be forgotten by the Chinese people [...]. We are extremely glad to see that the great Soviet people, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by Comrade Khrushchov, are building communism with all their efforts.¹²

Moreover, *Renmin Ribao* praised the Sino-Soviet treaty extensively in February 1962.¹³

But, on the other hand, Zhou Enlai, at the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress on 19 October 1961, implicitly criticised the Soviet Union for "unilaterally disturbing the solidarity

⁹Uno, Shigeaki, Koji Kobayashi and Susumu Yabuki (eds.), *Gendai Chugoku no rekishi 1949-1985 [The history of contemporary China]* (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1986), p.132.

¹⁰Ibid., pp.134-135.

¹¹Camilleri, Joseph, *Chinese foreign policy--the Maoist era and its aftermath* (Martin Robertson&Company Ltd., Oxford, 1980), p.53.

¹²'Soong Ching-ling greets Sino-Soviet Treaty Anniversary' in *Survey* No.2441, 21 February 1961, p.28.

¹³'Shoudu relie qingzhu Zhongsu tongmeng shier zhounian [The capital (of China) warmly celebrates the twelfth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty]' in *RMRB*, 14 February 1962, p.1.

of the fraternal parties" by the mid 1960's withdrawal of Soviet support for Chinese military development. After praising the CPSU for successfully building communism, Zhou stated:

We hold that should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal Parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity through consultation. Any public, onesided censure of any fraternal Party does not help unity and is not helpful to resolving problems. To bring a dispute between fraternal Parties or fraternal countries into the open in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. Such an attitude will only grieve those near and dear to us and gladden our enemies.¹⁴

Furthermore, the CCP expressed critical opinions about the Soviet attitude during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when the USSR installed missiles in Cuba and withdrew them because of confrontation with US President Kennedy.¹⁵ The absence of strong support from the USSR over the clash over the Sino-Indian border in the same month also made the Chinese leaders suspicious about the Soviet leadership in the socialist camp. As will be demonstrated, the Chinese government hoped that the Soviet Union would show more hostility towards the United States. After a series of denunciations of China about its "warlike" character by the Soviet Union in 1962, Mao clearly showed his decision that China would part from the USSR over the international communist movement.¹⁶ Chinese frustration at what was called the "revisionist policy" of the Soviet leaders boiled over and Chinese hostility towards the CPSU was finally unveiled.

In the open polemics between Maoist China and the Khrushchev-led USSR from 1963 to 1964, China thoroughly denounced the USSR as revisionist because it sought for "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. China insisted on a firm Marxist-Leninist policy over anti-imperialism and proletarian internationalism. Therefore, to China, "peaceful

¹⁴'Chou En-lai's speech at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union' in *PR* No.43, 27 October 1961

¹⁵Uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.232.

¹⁶Camilleri, p.66.

coexistence" with the imperialist United States would be impossible. However, at this stage, China still expressed the hope that the CPSU leaders might correct their "mistakes":

We have already warned you that the day you call a schismatic meeting will be the day you step into your grave. [...]. At this critical juncture, we hope you will weigh the pros and cons and choose carefully between continuing on the road to doom and turning back to safety.¹⁷

Chinese hostility to the Soviet Union continued to increase after the series of Chinese comments on the Soviet letters¹⁸ ended in mid 1964, followed by Khrushchev's resignation from the Central Committee of the CPSU in October. China regarded Soviet revisionism under Khrushchev as "the main danger to the international communist movement today."¹⁹

China's success in developing nuclear weapons in October 1964 clearly signified that China had become independent of Soviet aid. The CCP's intention to "be free from the dominance of outside powers"²⁰ was achieved.

In 1965, at a time when US involvement in Vietnam was increasing, China rejected the Soviet call for united action by all the communist parties against "imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism."²¹ One of the reasons the CCP did not unite with the CPSU to oppose US imperialism in Vietnam was because the CCP by that time regarded the CPSU leaders as "revisionists" who would be fighting US imperialism for their own interests, but not for the people. Also, the CCP maintained a negative attitude towards Soviet participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference that was supposed to be held in that year. Moreover, the Maoists never compromised on forming an alliance with the USSR over

¹⁷'C.P.C. Central Committee's reply to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee's letter of July 30, 1964' in *PR* No.36, 4 September 1964, p.7.

¹⁸There were open polemics over the international communist line between the Central Committee of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CPSU from September 1963 to July 1964. Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi* printed the CCP's comments on nine open letters of the CPSU. See English versions of the nine comments in *PR* No.37 (13 September 1963), No.38 (20 September 1963), No.43 (25 October 1963), No.47 (22 November 1963), No.51 (20 December 1963), No.6 (7 February 1964), No.14 (3 April 1964) and No.29 (17 July 1964).

¹⁹'Unite under the banner of the great October Revolution' in *PR* No.46, 13 November 1964, p.16.

²⁰Sutter, Robert G., *Chinese foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977* (Westview Press, Colorado, 1978), p.3.

²¹'Unity of action is an imperative requirement of the anti-imperialist struggle' in *Pravda*, 20 June 1965, quoted in Gittings, John, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet dispute--a commentary and extracts from the recent polemics 1963-1967* (Oxford University Press, London, 1968), p.238.

support for North Vietnam, even though the Soviet Union, in June 1965, insisted that "all the socialist countries and the entire world Communist movement must rally and co-operate in the cause of supporting the Vietnamese people."²²

Sino-Soviet relationships continued to deteriorate. In 1966 China expelled all Soviet students and government officers.²³ During the Cultural Revolution Soviet revisionism was the main external target of Maoist criticism (the main internal target consisted of "capitalist roaders," such as Liu Shaoqi, who was claimed by Maoists to be connected to international revisionism). The Maoists' stubborn attitude towards Soviet revisionism exacerbated China's isolated situation in the world. For example, the Japanese Communist Party, the CCP's long-term friend, insisted on an international united front including the USSR against the United States in Vietnam, but failed to persuade the Maoists and parted from the CCP on the anti-imperialist struggle in early 1966.

China's relations with the rest of the world were seriously disrupted from 1967 to 1968. The extremism of Chinese diplomacy when it was briefly controlled by radical Maoists caused a disastrous situation for China. The burning of the U.K. mission and the violence towards the British Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing by Red Guards in August 1967 could not be controlled even by the Maoist leaders in the CCP.²⁴ Red Guards and other "rebel" organisations broke down the rigid control of foreign policy hitherto exercised by the Party and the state. Divergent views on Chinese foreign policy were for a while openly expressed in the unofficial press.

Even though this research does not extend to matters after 1968, it is important to refer briefly to the Sino-Soviet boundary clash in 1969 in order to observe China's policy towards Soviet affairs in the 1960s.

²²Ibid., p.256.

²³Ellison, Herbert J., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict--a global perspective* (The University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1982), p.xviii.

²⁴Gurtov, Melvin, 'The foreign ministry and foreign affairs in the Chinese cultural revolution' in Robinson, Thomas W. (ed.), *The cultural revolution in China* (University of California Press, California, 1971), p.351. and Cradock, Percy, *Experiences of China* (John Murray, London, 1994), pp.72-73.

The tension over the Sino-Soviet boundary rose dramatically when the USSR began strengthening its military forces along the Chinese border in 1965.²⁵ The Chinese media reported that more than four thousand incidents occurred along the border from October 1964 to March 1969, and it was March 1969 when heavily reported military clashes between the two countries took place.²⁶ The armed invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1968 caused a severe shock to Chinese leaders. China became anxious about the possibility of a similar invasion of China by Soviet military forces.²⁷ Meanwhile, China never relaxed its hostility towards the Soviet Union. National security became one of the most important issues for China in 1969.

Thus I will look at Chinese propaganda with reference to China's relation with the Soviet Union and the importance of national security in the 1960s.

²⁵Barnett, A. Doak, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1977), pp.48-49.

²⁶Barnouin and Yu, p.86.

²⁷Camilleri, p.123.

Chapter One:

Anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism

1.1. Verbal attacks towards enemies and verbal encouragement towards allies

China's revolutionary propaganda became extreme in the 1960s. Criticism of the United States and the Soviet Union was the main subject of Chinese propaganda concerning the international struggle against imperialism. "Imperialism" is the policy of aggression by a state which seeks more capital abroad. In the 1960s, the United States was regarded by communist and socialist organisations and countries as the biggest imperialist power in the world. Even though imperialism was always claimed to be the basic enemy of the people of the world, revisionism, represented by the USSR, was also seen as a major enemy to be defeated. "Revisionism" is betrayal against Marxism-Leninism. According to the CCP, imperialism and revisionism were mutually dependent:

The Kosygin-Johnson talks marked the beginning of a new period of US-Soviet collusion in which the Soviet revisionists will throw themselves completely at the feet of US imperialists and play a secondary role in the counter-revolutionary "holy alliance" dominated by the United States.²⁸

In their desperate convulsions, the imperialists headed by the United States are pinning their last hopes on modern revisionism.²⁹

China's verbal strategy developed criticism against US imperialism as their main focus in the first half of the 1960s. The rest of the world was divided in the Chinese view

²⁸'Jen-min Jih-pao observer on Hollybush betrayal' from *RMRB*, 'Big betrayal at Hollybush', 3 July 1967, from *Xinhua*, 3 July 1967, in *Survey* No.3974, 6 July 1967, p.36.

²⁹'Marching forward together under the banner of Marxism-Leninism' in *PR* No.16, 19 April 1967, p.18.

into enemies and friends. Not only those who were anti-communist, but also those who opposed the CCP over US imperialism or Soviet revisionism were regarded by China as enemies. On the other hand, all the oppressed people of the world were considered to be friends of China--even if their leaders were aligned with Moscow. In addition, those governments which were neither pro-US nor pro-USSR also received warm encouragement from the CCP.

This section will firstly observe criticism against the "enemies" of "world revolution," mainly the United States and the Soviet Union. (Chinese denunciations of the USSR began in the mid 1960s.) Through this criticism I wish to examine the Chinese points of view on imperialism and revisionism and on its relations with them. Then I will look at China's verbal support for its friends, in order to analyse Chinese attempts at protecting itself from isolation on the international stage.

Imperialism was verbally attacked quite often as the "common enemy of the people of the whole world."³⁰ The CCP's aim to maintain this criticism was to make the imperialists isolated on the international stage. The CCP claimed that the imperialists were to be smashed because they wouldn't change their character.³¹ The CCP announced in May 1962:

Together with the other peoples of Asia and the rest of the world, the Chinese people will eventually settle accounts with the U.S. aggressors for the blood they have spilt.³²

Song Qingling, then Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China, gave a lecture in Ceylon in early 1964. She defined imperialism as the biggest "obstacle" in establishing world peace:

[Imperialism] is still the most vicious enemy of man's progress and the sole source of war in the world today.³³

But she insisted that China was reluctant to be warlike:

³⁰'Mao Zedong zhuxi guanyu zhichi Gongguo (Li) renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de shengming [Chairman Mao Zedong's statement on support for Congolese (Leopoldville) people's opposition toward US aggression]' from Xinhua, 28 November 1964, in *HQ* No.23,24, 1964, p.2.

³¹For example, 'Kennidi de da yinmou [Kennedy's big plot]' in *RMRB*, 21 June 1963, p.3.

³²'Serious warning to U.S. aggressors' in *PR* No.18, 4 May 1962, p.14.

³³'United, the people are invincible' by Song Qingling, 28 February 1964, in *PR* No.10, 6 March 1964, p.10.

(The imperialists) have tried to turn China's unwavering stand for peace and its willingness to settle all problems by means of negotiation on the basis of principle, into a warlike stance [...].³⁴

This was far from the image of the warlike Chinese depicted in a lot of CCP anti-imperialist propaganda (discussed below). It seems that she tried not to give a warlike image of China to "Third World" "allies." As will be demonstrated in Chapter Three, Chinese leaders were trying to present both militant and peaceful images of China to the rest of the world.

Critiques of imperialism were sometimes associated with critiques of racism. Mao Zedong criticised US imperialism for racial discrimination in August 1963. Mao insisted that "fascist assaults" on black people revealed "reactionary" internal policy and the "aggressive" diplomacy of the US government.³⁵ He also defined "ethnic struggle (*minzu douzheng*)" as one kind of "class struggle."³⁶ When the statement was published in 1963, Beijing was trying to establish diplomatic relations with many African countries which had been newly decolonised. It was the right time for Mao to criticise US imperialism through expressing his support for black people's protests against racial discrimination in America.³⁷ His support for the black Americans was expected not only to give African countries a favourable impression of Beijing, but to clearly present the "US imperialists" as the enemy of the people.

Criticism of US imperialism by Red Guards was not as strong as their criticism of revisionism, partly because there was no direct US aggression in China at that time, unless the American relationship with Taiwan was regarded as aggression. In addition, the CCP focused on denunciations of "revisionism" more than imperialism, when the Red Guards emerged in mid 1966. (However, US imperialism was always thought of as the root of all evil, but perhaps paradoxically, Soviet "revisionism" was attacked more.)

³⁴Ibid., p.12.

³⁵'Huyu shijie renmin lianheqilai fandui Meiguo diguozhuyi de zhongzu qishi, zhichi Meiguo heiren fandui zhongzu qishi de douzheng de shengming [Calling upon the people of the world to unite to oppose racial discrimination by U.S. imperialism and support the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination]' by Mao Zedong, 8 August 1963, in *Zhongguo Funü* No.9, 1963, p.2.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷In the statement, Mao said that he had been asked by a black American leader to issue a statement in favour of black Americans' struggles against racial discrimination. See the first sentence of the same statement in *Zhongguo Funü* No.9, 1963, p.1.

China's verbal attacks against the revisionists in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were even more extreme than those against the United States. It is interesting to note that Chinese articles sometimes used words such as "shameless" and "shameful" in their criticisms of the leaders of the USSR. The first two quotes below were made by the CCP when it was trying hard to form an international united front against the imperialists in the early 1960s, and the last quote was made by the CCP at the peak of the Cultural Revolution (CCP emphasis on the international anti-imperialist struggle became less significant during the time):

Is this not tantamount to shamelessly claiming that some sort of "leadership" exists in the international communist movement and that you (the Soviet leaders) have this "leadership?"³⁸

To cater to the needs of imperialism, they (the Soviet leaders) are undermining the national-liberation movement and becoming more and more shameless apologists of U.S. neo-colonialism.³⁹

By collaborating with U.S. imperialism in the "two Chinas" plot, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique will only further expose its shameful features as U.S. imperialism's accomplice before people of the whole world.⁴⁰

The CCP's choice of words was thus consistent even when the international conditions around China had changed. Such language speaks of Chinese contempt for Soviet "betrayals." The CCP attempted to show the "Soviet revisionists" in a bad light in order to emphasise that it was the USSR that was wrong. It also can be said that China tried to show an image of the Soviet leaders as corrupted and thus without morals or a sense of shame. To

³⁸'The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and ourselves--Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.' in *PR* No.37, 13 September 1963, p.20.

³⁹'Peaceful coexistence--Two diametrically opposed policies--Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (6)' in *PR* No.51, 20 December 1963, p.16.

⁴⁰'Strong protest against Soviet revisionist clique's crime of collaborating with U.S. imperialism in "two Chinas" plot' in *PR* No.13, 29 March 1968, p.9.

China, the Khrushchev-led Soviet Union seemed to have betrayed the rest of the socialist camp and their past "great leaders", such as Stalin.

Moreover, in mid 1963, China complained about the USSR seeking an alliance with the United States "in order to abuse China":

[The] Soviet leaders [...] have been gnashing their teeth in their bitter hatred towards socialist China. They use the same language as U.S. imperialism in abusing China. This is a U.S.-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple.⁴¹

Some CCP leaders thought that the two big powers would continue to reduce tension between themselves and would begin to seek an anti-Chinese policy together. In October China claimed that the Soviet revisionists were serving neo-colonialism, headed by the United States.⁴²

The nuclear question is an interesting matter on which to observe China's verbal tactics against the USSR. In 1963, China opposed the Soviet claim that Soviet nuclear power could protect the whole socialist camp, including China.⁴³ This argument had been advanced by Moscow when pursuing a nuclear non-proliferation agreement with the United States. The grounds for the opposition was that non-proliferation would prevent each country in the socialist camp from developing its own defence power.⁴⁴ China maintained firmly that while support from friends was welcome, each country should assure its own defence.⁴⁵ The Soviet Union was denounced by China as attempting to monopolise nuclear power with the United States and Britain.⁴⁶ However, about one year after that, China developed its own nuclear weapon and celebrated by reporting congratulations from other countries. Some of these messages from tiny foreign political organisations were presented as if they spoke for the masses. The *People's Voice* of the Communist Party of New Zealand wrote:

⁴¹'A betrayal of the Soviet people!' from *RMRB* (editorial) 'This is betrayal of the Soviet people!', 3 August 1963, translated in *PR* No.32, 9 August 1963, p.11.

⁴²'Apologists of neo-colonialism--Comment on the open letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (4)' in *PR* No.43, 25 October 1963, p.14.

⁴³'92. Chinese Government statement of 15 August 1963 on proposals for nuclear non-proliferation' in Gittings, p.191, originally from 'Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government--a comment on the Soviet Government's statement of August 3' in *People's Daily*, 15 August 1963

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p.192.

China's emergence as a nuclear power means a strengthening of the world socialist camp, the international working class and the forces of peace.⁴⁷

Despite the fact that Chinese leaders had attempted reconciliation with the Khrushchev-led Soviet Union in 1964, Sino-Soviet mutual denunciation escalated. A *Hongqi* commentator wrote in early 1966 that "world domination by Soviet-US collaboration is the spirit of Khrushchev's revisionist line."⁴⁸ The CCP often emphasised a Soviet-US alliance to try to give the rest of the world the strong impression that imperialism and revisionism were inseparable.

Denunciations of the USSR leaders by Red Guards were extreme. Chinese reaction to the "persecution" of a group of Chinese exchange students and the Chinese embassy by Soviet policemen in Moscow in February 1967 escalated the tone of criticism:

[It] has committed a towering crime rarely seen in the annals of global diplomacy, and incurred another blood debt to the Chinese people.⁴⁹

Once the Soviet revisionist paper tiger is pierced it turns into a worthless pile of dog shit.⁵⁰

Then "vigorous" actions have in fact revealed that the Soviet revisionist bastards are a gang of clowns who dare not be exposed to the light of day!⁵¹

A Red Guard article, under the title of "Down with Soviet revisionism! Strangle Brezhnev!" introduced a Red Guards' interview with three Soviet "friends" and purported to show how much the Soviet people hated Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin.⁵² Those Soviet leaders

⁴⁷'Significance of China's nuclear success' in *PR* No.45, 6 November 1964, p.13.

⁴⁸'Sugong xin lingdao pengxing Sumei hezuo luxian de gongzhuang [Confessions concerning line of Soviet-US collaboration pursued by new leaders of CPSU]' in *HQ* No.2, 1966, p.1.

⁴⁹'Zalan Suxiu faxisi mogui jiduan [Smash the Soviet revisionist, fascist group of devils]' in *Hongwei Zhanbao*, 9 February 1967, p.1, in *RGP* Vol.8, p.2201.

⁵⁰'Song "wenshen" xiaoji [Delivering "god of plague" notes]' in *Honwei Zhanbao*, 9 February 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.8, p.2202.

⁵¹'Nuchi Suxiu hundan [Angrily denounce the Soviet idiots]' in *Dongfanghongbao*, 15 February 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4221.

⁵²'Dadao Suxiu! Jiaosi Bolieriniefu!--Zhongguo renmin bu shi haore de! [Down with Soviet revisionism! Strangle Brezhnev!--The Chinese are not people to be trifled with!]' in *Shoudu Hongweibing*, 14 February 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.11, p.3510.

were portrayed as the biggest traitors, who had not only become hostile to the socialist countries, but had also badly influenced many of the Chinese leaders, such as Liu Shaoqi. These Soviet and Chinese leaders were the main targets of the Cultural Revolution.

Rhetoric of "Third World" struggle

Chinese verbal encouragement to "the people of the world" was significant. The CCP emphasised that they were always on the side of oppressed peoples. In addition, Chinese media reported anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist statements by people from "hostile" countries, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, in order to show that all the people in the world were going to be united against their common "enemies."

The CCP always emphasised their "full support" for the people of the world. For instance, Chinese encouragement went as follows:

The Chinese people will ...give full support to the people of Palestine and the Arab countries in their struggle against U.S. imperialism, a struggle which the Chinese people regard as a powerful help in their own struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression.⁵³

All governments that suppressed their people were regarded as US "lackeys" and, according to the CCP, the US was the root of all evil.

Moreover, as shown in the statement above, the Chinese government took a firm attitude on the point that the people of each country had to pursue their anti-imperialist struggles on their own. This line implicitly indicated China's unwillingness to be directly involved in anti-imperialist struggles overseas. This Chinese stand was shown repeatedly in their "support" for the Vietnamese people during the war, which was more moral than substantial.

With their verbal support for "the people," mainly of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Chinese leaders tried to indicate how many friends they had and how much the imperialists and their "lackeys" were isolated in the world. Before the Cultural Revolution, when the

⁵³'China supports Palestinian and Arab people' in *PR* No.13, 27 March 1964, p.13.

Chinese leaders often insisted on forming a firm international anti-imperialist united front, Song Qingling said in a lecture in Ceylon:

Those who seek to isolate China are themselves being isolated. The Chinese people know they have friends everywhere.⁵⁴

She also implied China's leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle:

[...] because China has stood in the forefront of this struggle, it has become the target of a converging attack politically, economically and militarily.⁵⁵

Thus China wanted to give itself an image of being a reliable friend to the rest of the "Third World" countries.

This Chinese rhetorical strategy, however, changed after the failure of forming an anti-imperialist united front. Once the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, while giving encouragement and support for "Third World" countries, the Chinese government no longer emphasised that China was a "reliable friend" of them. As I will discuss in the following chapters, Chinese rhetoric over international matters during the Cultural Revolution saw a great influence from Maoism which implicitly presented China under Mao as the revolutionary leader of the world.

Those who opposed the US and USSR were referred to by China as being involved in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. China was portrayed as one of the revolutionaries, and many CCP statements gave the impression that the Chinese government had militant friendships with "Third World" countries in the struggle against imperialism. However, and especially after mid 1960s, China's isolation in the world became more evident. Despite this fact, China's strong verbal support for its "allies" remained unchanged.

⁵⁴'United, the people are invincible' in *PR* No.10, 6 March 1964, p.12.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

1.2. Criticism against the United States over the Vietnam question

The Vietnam War provided a good opportunity for the Chinese Communist Party to denounce the United States. The war clearly showed the world an actual example of "aggression by the imperialists and their lackeys" and "the people's struggle for national liberation." China's denunciation of US imperialism in the war became even more harsh when the war escalated in July 1965. In this section I will examine Chinese verbal attacks on the US and verbal support for the Vietnamese people. By doing so, I will try to show how China attempted to create for itself an image as "the most reliable country" in the socialist camp, while actually seeking for a compromise with the United States.

Some scholars have insisted that Chinese leaders verbally took a firm stand against the US, because, even before the US bombing in North Vietnam in 1965, China was quite confident of the future victory by the North Vietnamese people.⁵⁶ In an interview with Edgar Snow in January 1965, Mao Zedong implied that he believed in the Vietnamese people's victory by themselves.⁵⁷ It was important for the CCP to give strong verbal support for the Vietnamese people in order to give the world, especially the socialist camp, an impression that firm Chinese assistance was one of the crucial factors that led the Vietnamese people to the success in the war.

The anti-US statements made by the CCP on Vietnam were quite confident:

U.S. imperialism will not save itself from disastrous defeat in south Viet Nam, whatever scheme it may resort to.⁵⁸

More significantly, a *Renmin Ribao* editorial described China's firm stand against the US provocatively:

⁵⁶For example, Tao, Jay, 'Mao's world outlook: Vietnam and the revolution in China' in *Asian Survey* Vol.8, No.5, May 1968, pp.417-418.

⁵⁷Snow, Edgar, 'South of the mountains to north of the seas--January 9, 1965: interview with Chairman Mao Tse-tung' in appendixes of Snow, Edgar, *The long revolution* (Random House, New York, 1972), p.216.

⁵⁸'U.S. move to extend war in South Viet Nam condemned' by the Chinese Government in *PR* No.3, 15 January 1965, p.7.

To tell you the truth, we are waiting for you in battle array. If you insist on imposing a war on us, then you are sure to receive heavy counter-blows!⁵⁹

This statement was made just before US bombings in North Vietnam began in the summer of 1965. Mao Zedong had never thought that the US would attack North Vietnam until the bombing started.⁶⁰ The CCP's provocative tone above seems to have been influenced by the optimistic prediction by the Chinese leaders.

CCP leaders attacked the character of US imperialism in extreme language. Peng Zhen, then Mayor of Beijing and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, called the then US President "the Hitler of today":

The "Johnson Doctrine" is the fascism of our times, and Johnson is the Hitler of today.⁶¹

Moreover, a *Ta-kung Pao* commentator described the nature of US imperialism as "cannibalistic" when the US bombed hospitals and sanatoria in North Vietnam in the summer of 1965.⁶²

However, the extremism in words coincided with moderation in action. China's verbal attacks on the US aggression in Vietnam were also aimed at covering up the Maoist policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the US. Despite the fact that China had repeatedly claimed that US aggression towards Vietnam was the same as aggression towards China,⁶³ China did not militarily attack the US even when the US bombed North Vietnam in July 1965. In addition to this, soon after the bombing occurred in 1965, Zhu De, then Chairman of the National People's Congress, made a speech as follows:

⁵⁹'U.S. aggressors must be punished' from *RMRB* (editorial), 9 February 1965, translated in *PR* No.7, 12 February 1965, p.18.

⁶⁰'39. Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong--Beijing, 17 November 1968' in Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg (eds.), *77 conversations between Chinese and foreign leaders on the wars in Indochina, 1964-1977*, Working Paper No.22 (Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 1998), p.145. According to the article, Mao Zedong told Pham Van Dong, the head of a DRV delegation to Moscow, "I never thought that they would attack North Vietnam. But my prediction was wrong when they bombed the North. [...]."

⁶¹'Peng Chen's speech at Peking rally--welcoming the D.R.V. National Assembly Delegation' in *PR* No.30, 23 July 1965, p.8.

⁶²'Ta-Kung Pao protests against U.S. bombing of hospitals in North Vietnam' from *Xinhua*, 17 July 1965, in *Survey* No.3502, 22 July 1965, p.28.

⁶³'Meiguo dui Yuenan Minzhu gongheguo de qinfan jiu shi dui Zhongguo de qinfan [The US aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam means aggression against China]' by the Chinese Government in *RMRB*, 6 August 1964, p.1.

The Chinese people have made every preparation for countering the U.S. imperialists' scheme to expand their war adventures. No matter what happens and how costly the price, we will stay firm on this stand of proletarian internationalism.⁶⁴

But the CCP seemed to calculate the possible cost of the full involvement in the war. The article, "Long live the victory of people's war!" written by Lin Biao, then Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP, Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defence, skilfully tried to avoid China's direct involvement in people's war:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that our fundamental policy should rest on the foundation of our own strength. Only by relying on our own efforts can we in all circumstances remain invincible. [...]. In order to make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid--even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution--no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.⁶⁵

As a result, China avoided any hint of a direct confrontation against the US, even though Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Chinese people were all ready for giving "staunch backing" to the North Vietnamese people and that China "absolutely [would] not stand idly by [...]."⁶⁶ Furthermore, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, Vice-Chairman of the

⁶⁴'Banquet for Vietnam National Assembly Friendship Delegation in Peking' from Xinhua, 13 July 1965, in *Survey* No.3498, 16 July 1965, p.24.

⁶⁵'Long live the victory of people's war!' in *HQ* No.10, 1965, p.17, translated in *PR* No.36, 3 September 1965, p.22.

⁶⁶'U.S. aggressive troops must be forced to quit Indo-China' by Chen Yi in *PR* No.9, 26 February 1965, p.4.

National Defence Council, Ye Jianying, said to the Vietnamese guests at a banquet as follows:

Come what may and irrespective of any risks, we will support you in all fields with all our strength, till the U.S. aggressors are thoroughly liquidated.⁶⁷

But the Chinese military support in actuality was much more limited than what might be expected from Ye's speech above.

The CCP criticised the US as harshly as possible, while emphasising "militant friendship" between the Chinese people and the Vietnamese people.⁶⁸ Both the criticism and support by the CCP gave a strong impression that the Vietnam War was the matter of all the people (especially Asian people) who were against the US. The CCP wanted to create an imaginary picture of "Asia versus the imperialists" over the Vietnam War.

Washington's sending south Korean puppet troops to south Viet Nam is part of its malicious plan to "make Asians fight Asians."⁶⁹

The public statements that the Chinese people were thoroughly supporting the people's liberation war in Asia and that the Chinese people were sharing hardships with other Asian people were supposed to contribute to the promotion of China's image in Asia. Therefore China's interests should be seen as the same as those of other Asian people. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial also denounced US imperialism as the cause of the establishment of a "Northeast Asia military alliance":

It is perfectly clear that speeding up the "Japan-south (sic) Korea talks" is entirely the result of behind-the-scene (sic) prodding by U.S. imperialism.⁷⁰

Thus China attempted to impress upon the rest of the peoples of the world, especially the Asian peoples, a hostile image of the US. At the same time, China tried to present itself

⁶⁷'China celebrates N.F.L. Anniversary' in *PR* No.52, 24 December 1965, p.8.

⁶⁸'Chinese residents in Vietnam called on to participate in Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. struggle' from *Xinhua*, 6 July 1965, in *Survey* No.3494, p.34.

⁶⁹'A grave move' from *RMRB* (editorial) 'A grave U.S. move to spread the flames of war in Indo-China', 14 January 1965, translated in *PR* No.4, 22 January 1965, p.7.

⁷⁰'Washington's new move to aggravate Far East tension' from *RMRB* (editorial) 'Another grave move by the United States to aggravate tension in the Far East', 23 February 1965, translated in *PR* No.9, 26 February 1965, p.14.

as an Asian, socialist country that would stand with and support its fellow Asian nations and that would never compromise with US imperialism on peaceful settlement of the war.

CCP denunciations of the United States became less provocative after the Cultural Revolution started. Instead, many of the *Peking Review* articles on the Vietnam War in 1967 emphasised Chinese support in accordance with the "teachings" of Mao Zedong. Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said:

Consistently following the teachings of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Chinese Government and people regard it as their bounden internationalist duty to support and aid the Vietnamese people's revolutionary struggle.⁷¹

Guo Moruo (Kuo Mo-jo), a Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee and Chairman of the China Peace Committee, said in a Beijing rally for anti-US over the Vietnam War:

Thanks to the [Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] initiated and led personally by our great leader Chairman Mao, [...] the Chinese people had further revolutionized themselves, and become ever more militant and high-spirited, thus bringing still greater strength into play to support and aid the Vietnamese people's war of resistance against U.S. aggression [...].⁷²

In November, Premier Zhou Enlai received Ngo Minh Loan, Ambassador of the DRV, and stated:

The Chinese Government and people, who follow the teachings of the great leader Chairman Mao, have always taken it as their bounden internationalist obligation to support the Vietnamese people in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.⁷³

In the early 1968, Zhou Enlai again said to Ngo Minh Loan:

⁷¹'Statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the new developments in the Vietnam situation' in *PR* No.11, 10 March 1967, p.13.

⁷²'Firm support for the Vietnamese people to completely defeat U.S. imperialism' in *PR* No.13, 24 March 1967, p.10.

⁷³'Premier Chou En-lai expresses firm support for D.R.V. government statement's just stand' in *PR* No.46, 10 November 1967, p.25.

[...] armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, the 700 million Chinese people who had been tempered in the great proletarian cultural revolution vowed to provide a powerful backing for the Vietnamese people and resolutely support them in carrying the war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation through to the end.⁷⁴

While maintaining its expression of firm support for the Vietnamese people, the CCP thus seems to have shifted the point of emphasis in Vietnamese-related rhetoric from militant and provocative denunciations of the US to Mao-led China's international obligation to back up the Vietnamese people and to support them in their fight for "national salvation," the reunification of the nation under communist leadership. The CCP, however, continued criticising the US for trying to settle the war peacefully.

China did not support North Vietnam by direct military intervention, although China often expressed highly militant attitudes in its publications. China thus maintained the line that any Chinese military troops would not be sent abroad. Instead, as Ye Jianying had said (see above), China supported the Vietnamese people in some fields with "all [their] strength." One study claimed that between October 1965 and March 1968, three hundred and twenty thousand Chinese soldiers were sent to Vietnam, and a great amount of goods were sent by China to Vietnam.⁷⁵ Michael Schaller claimed that Beijing sent about fifty thousand soldiers to North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.⁷⁶ He said, "Though not participating in ground combat, they (Chinese soldiers sent from Beijing) helped operate anti-aircraft weapons and communications facilities."⁷⁷ Moreover, Gordon H. Chang said that "the number of Chinese support personnel (engineers, workers, technicians) in North Vietnam increased to 40,000 during the first part of 1966, [...]."⁷⁸ Whatever the number of Chinese

⁷⁴Our great leader Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin offer warmest congratulations on new and great victories in Vietnam's war against U.S. aggression--Premier Chou and Vice-Premier Chen Yi receive Vietnamese Ambassador and the acting head of South Vietnam N.F.L. Permanent Mission to China' in *PR* No.6, 9 February 1968, p.6.

⁷⁵Uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.238.

⁷⁶Schaller, Michael, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1979), p.155.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp.155-156.

⁷⁸Chang, Gordon H., *Friends and enemies--The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford University Press, California, 1990), p.272.

soldiers sent from Beijing was, we can see from this that China was reluctant to involve itself fully in the war, while often "showing" its militant images to the rest of the world. What Beijing did for North Vietnam was the maximum support that would not provoke direct US attacks on China.⁷⁹ China did not even publicise the fact of its actual support until long after this intensive period.

Thus Chinese official rhetoric over the Vietnam War was quite subtle. On the one hand, Beijing wanted to show its militancy against imperialism. That was supposed to be a significant difference between socialist China and "revisionist" Soviet Union. But, on the other hand, the CCP implied that China would not help the Vietnamese people by sending its own troops. China wanted to become more important both in the socialist camp and in Asia, while avoiding full involvement in people's liberation wars. Moreover, the CCP's "patience" in action seems to have drawn the clear line between "socialist China" that had supported the neighbour's "national liberation struggle" by its own people and "revisionist Soviet Union" that had extended its military power abroad.

1.3. The importance of Chinese interests and security

China's call for worldwide anti-imperialist struggles and its international revolutionary line sometimes contradicted its national interests and security. The contradiction was particularly significant when, for instance, China established diplomatic relations with the "bourgeois" French government in 1964. Despite its denunciations of colonialism, the CCP ignored the de Gaulle government's control in French Somaliland⁸⁰ and praised the friendship between France and China. By doing so, Chinese leaders were pursuing their national interests, such as gaining justification for nuclear development.⁸¹ The French government was also

⁷⁹Uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.238.

⁸⁰Van Ness, p.96.

⁸¹Halperin, Morton H., 'China and the bomb--Chinese nuclear strategy' in MacFarquhar, Roderick (ed.), *China under Mao: politics takes command--a selection of articles from The China Quarterly* (The M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts, 1966), p.454.

opposing the US-Soviet "nuclear domination," so the alliance with France was supposed to have given support for China's nuclear development.

The CCP's attitude towards anti-British riots in Hong Kong in the summer of 1967 is another good example. The CCP did not give thorough verbal support to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movements there, because China wanted to maintain "peaceful coexistence" with Britain in order, for one thing, to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity, which had largely helped China ^{proper} economically and to keep Hong Kong open as a door to the outside world. (I will discuss this later in this section.) Although the CCP gave the Hong Kong "revolutionaries" full verbal support at the beginning, the amount of the verbal support for the riots significantly declined soon after the riots escalated into a crucial stage in the summer of 1967. China's militant attitude towards Britain over "colonial" Hong Kong during the short time when the revolutionaries were openly supported by the CCP was quite exceptional.

In this section, I will examine the verbal strategies of the Chinese publications mainly over the French and Hong Kong matters in order to look at the CCP's stance that gave national interests priority over the international anti-imperialist struggle.

Chinese rhetoric over Sino-French diplomacy

In January 1962, *Renmin Ribao* criticised the French President de Gaulle as being the same as the US imperialists:

Firstly, it (France) is exerting every effort to maintain its control over the French "community." For this reason, it is exasperated by the U.S. thrust into its spheres of influence in Africa. To preserve its economic interests in Katanga Province, it is opposing the U.S. attempt to swallow up the Congo. Another source of its anxiety is that the establishment of U.S. strongholds close to central Africa may become a dagger at the heart of the French "community." [...] de Gaulle stands on the same front as the U.S. ruling circles on the fundamental

questions of protecting imperialist and colonial interests and opposing the socialist camp.⁸²

Moreover, in March, *Peking Review* carried an article about anti-government movements by the French people over the Algerian question.⁸³ The article denounced the French government's colonial policy:

Throughout the long years of the colonial war in Algeria, the people of metropolitan France have fought steadfastly against their government's colonial policy. [...]. Their struggle, complementing the armed struggle of the Algerian people, has played an important part in forcing the French Government to sit down for peace talks with Algeria.⁸⁴

Even though Algeria became independent in 1962, France still kept French Somaliland under its control.

However, China managed to establish diplomatic relations with the French government in 1964 in the belief that this might create difficulties for the United States' relationships with European countries.⁸⁵ Despite the fact that the then French government under President de Gaulle was obviously "bourgeois" and "colonialist," and that the government had been a target of the struggle by "oppressed peoples" of Africa, China chose to maintain a peaceful relationship with the government. In January 1964, China celebrated the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries as follows:

Although the two countries have different social systems, yet both peoples love peace and have a traditional bond of friendship. The establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and France is not only conducive to the further development of friendship between the two countries, but also to the realization of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and to world peace [...]. On the proclamation of the People's Republic

⁸²De Gaulle's desperate struggle for "big power status" in *RMRB*, 9 January 1962, translated in 'De Gaulle wants "big power status"' in *PR* No.2, 12 January 1962, p.19.

⁸³Algeria had been resisting the French colonial policy since 31 October 1954.

⁸⁴The French people's fight for peace in Algeria,' written by Yang Xiaoneng, in *PR* No.11, 16 March 1962, p.8.

⁸⁵Van Ness, pp.98-99.

of China, Chairman Mao Tse-tung declared: "This Government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government which is willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty."⁸⁶

Thus China emphasised "peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems," which was one of the ultimate purposes of the world revolution, without referring to the colonialist character of the then French government. For China, France was an ally who opposed the common enemies; the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong's conversation with French Minister of State, André Malraux, in 1965, revealed that, in Chinese international relations, Mao attached great importance to making "various kinds of friends" through finding "something in common" with each other.⁸⁷ He also implied at the interview that China should establish friendly relations with any countries as long as they were against US imperialism:

Chairman Mao: [...]. We have various kinds of friends. You are

[...] one

kind of friend. At the same time, Chairman of the

Indonesian Communist Party, Aidit, who has

been

visiting in Beijing, is also a friend of ours [...].

We have

something in common with Aidit, and also do

with you.

Malraux: Those common grounds are different from each other.

Chairman Mao: Some of them are the same. For example, (you and

⁸⁶'Greeting the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations' in *PR* No.5, 31 January 1964, p.10.

⁸⁷'Jiejian Faguo guowu buzhang Maerluo shi tanhua julü [Report on conversation at the interview with French Minister of State Malraux]' in *Mao Zedong Sixiang wansui [Long live Mao Zedong Thought]*, Vol.2, June 1967, p.370.

ourselves have common ground like) how to deal
with
the double-dealers; US imperialism and British
imperialism. [...].⁸⁸

China's support for France over the nuclear question in 1963 contributed to its justification for its own atomic bomb development.⁸⁹ France was opposing the United States, which was wishing for the conclusion of a nuclear test ban with Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China.⁹⁰ Morton H. Halperin has noted that "the Chinese have sought by analogy to make their case for the need for a Chinese nuclear capability by stressing the French need for such a force and the American attempt to dominate its alliance by being the sole Western nuclear power."⁹¹ In a government statement, China expressed its opposition to a treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests which had been signed by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union on 25 July:

The central purpose of this treaty is, through a partial ban on nuclear tests, to prevent all the threatened peace-loving countries, including China, from increasing their defence capability, so that the United States may be more unbridled in threatening and blackmailing these countries.⁹²

The friendship with the French government deteriorated soon after the Cultural Revolution began. To China, an international united front against the United States was not the key for the "world revolution" any more. Efforts for making friendly ties with other anti-US governments and communist and socialist parties almost appeared meaningless to the CCP unless based on opposition to the USSR. China's diplomacy became radical; whoever opposed Chinese "revolutionary" policy, was regarded by China as its enemy. Thus a change in China's interests became observable.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Halperin, p.454.

⁹⁰Chang, pp.233-234.

⁹¹Halperin, p.454.

⁹²'Statement of the Chinese government--Advocating the complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons/ proposing a conference of the government heads of all countries of the world' in *PR* No.31, 2 August 1963, p.7.

Forty nine Chinese students marched to the Soviet Embassy in Paris in order to protest against the Soviet violence aimed at Chinese Maoist students in Moscow at the beginning of the year. At that time, the French police tried to calm down the Chinese demonstration. The CCP denounced the French "raid" on those "heroic" Chinese students:

Violating the Chinese students' deep feelings for Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the most respected and beloved leader of the Chinese people, the police tore up his portraits and trampled on copies of *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung* [...]. (In Beijing,) [the] walls of the (French) embassy building and the grounds outside were posted with the slogans: [...] "Bash in the French thugs' heads!"⁹³

Van Ness has pointed out that, by mid 1966, China first mentioned its support for French Somaliland, which had been under French colonial rule.⁹⁴ (Foreign Minister Chen Yi mentioned the French Somali Coast as one of the places in which had been struggling "to oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence."⁹⁵) Although Chen Yi's speech did not refer to "armed" struggle of French Somali people, Van Ness suggests that the expression of the support was partly due to tense Sino-French relations, "as Paris sought to develop closer ties with the Soviet Union and made efforts to find a basis for negotiations to end the Vietnam War, [...]."⁹⁶ The rhetorical change might be partly due to internal struggles in the CCP leadership just before the Cultural Revolution. Harish Kapur notes that Chinese "press articles on France lost their earlier friendliness" in mid 1967.⁹⁷ An article in *Peking Review* used the term "French imperialism" and criticised France for being on the US side in the Middle East:⁹⁸

French imperialism, which claimed to be "neutral" during these events,⁹⁹ has actually played "big power politics" along with the United States, Britain and the

⁹³'Chinese students' valiant struggle in Paris' in *PR* No.6, 3 February 1967, p.30.

⁹⁴Van Ness, p.99. (footnote no.32)

⁹⁵'Vice-Premier Chen Yi's speech--At the opening ceremony of Afro-Asian writers' emergency meeting--' in *PR* No.27, 1 July 1966, p.33.

⁹⁶Van Ness, p.99. (footnote no.32)

⁹⁷Kapur, Harish, *Distant neighbours--China and Europe* (Pinter Publishers, London, 1990), p.92.

⁹⁸'Arab people, unite, make sustained efforts, and fight imperialism to the end!' in *RMRB* (editorial), 11 June 1967, translated in *PR* No.25, p.12.

⁹⁹Israel, with support from the US, attacked Syria and other Arab countries.

Soviet Union and shown itself as standing on the side of the U.S.-Israeli aggressors.¹⁰⁰

Chinese rhetoric in publications thus became hostile to the French government again. As in so many other areas of Chinese foreign relations, in mid 1967 the wish to appear radical seemed to outweigh the previous policy of foreign alliances.

Chinese rhetoric over the British occupation of Hong Kong

Now I will look at Chinese rhetorical strategies towards British colonialism in Hong Kong. Chinese criticisms of British imperialism also indicated the superiority of national interests over support for struggles of national liberation.

Hong Kong was supposed to be a site for struggles against imperialism. Once the Cultural Revolution started, anti-British demonstrations in Hong Kong, which is said to have begun for industrial reasons, developed into violent national liberation movements. After several acts of violent suppression of Hong Kong activists by the British authorities in May 1967, *Peking Review* said:

The whole nation, they (the people of mainland China) said, was determined to smash [the] British imperialist's reactionary rule in Hongkong, destroy this hell under British colonial domination and support the struggle of their compatriots in Hongkong to the end.¹⁰¹

Another *Peking Review* writer wrote:

Politically, the "dignity" and "prestige" of the British colonial rulers in Hongkong have been shattered and they have been completely exposed as paper tigers. Thus, "governor" Trench has been revealed as the hangman he is; people have started calling British colonial officials names and condemning the British authorities in the "courtroom"; [...].¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰'Arab people, unite, make sustained efforts, and fight imperialism to the end!' in *RMRB* (editorial), 11 June 1967, translated in *PR* No.25, 16 June 1967, p.12.

¹⁰¹'Hongkong's revolutionary mass movement on the upsurge' in *PR* No.25, 16 June 1967, p.32.

¹⁰²'50,000 workers strike in Hongkong' in *PR* No.27, 30 June 1967, p.25.

The CCP declared that the suppressions were committed not only against the people of Hong Kong, but against "the entire Chinese people."¹⁰³ Moreover, shortly after this statement China said as follows:

Hong Kong has been Chinese territory since ancient times [...]. Sooner or later, the Chinese people will make a thoroughgoing liquidation of this debt with British imperialism.¹⁰⁴

Thus the CCP's denunciations of British imperialism were significant. Chinese authorities said that British imperialism violated Chinese territorial sovereignty and abused the Chinese people by oppressing some of them.

Such militancy in Chinese policy towards the British authorities in Hong Kong, however, had never been seen before the summer of 1967. Kevin P. Lane notes that a *People's Daily* editorial in 1963 revealed Chinese "conservative" policy on British occupation in Hong Kong:

With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the *status quo* should be maintained. [...]. To be frank, there is no need for the Chinese people to prove their courage and staunchness in combatting imperialism by making a show of force on the questions of Hong Kong and Macau.¹⁰⁵

Van Ness has explained "colonial" Hong Kong's importance to the Chinese economy, suggesting that "Hong Kong during 1965 was politically one of the most quiet spots in Asia [...]."¹⁰⁶ He also pointed out that, although the Chinese press criticised the United States for using Hong Kong as a military base in the Vietnam War, Beijing did not attack British use of Hong Kong for military purposes in 1965.¹⁰⁷ In early 1966, *Peking*

¹⁰³'Tighten the noose around the neck of British imperialism, says Jen-min Jih-pao' from Xinhua, 7 August 1967, in *Survey* No.3998, 10 August 1967, p.24.

¹⁰⁴'Hong Kong is Chinese territory' in *RMRB*, 20 August 1967, translated in Xinhua, 20 August 1967, in *Survey* No.4007, 23 August 1967, p.23.

¹⁰⁵People's Daily, 8 March 1963, quoted in Lane, Kevin P., *Sovereignty and the status quo--The historical roots of China's Hong Kong policy* (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990), p.65.

¹⁰⁶Van Ness, p.161.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p.162. (footnote no.4)

Review carried an article which criticised British "colonial" policy in Suez, but again the article did not criticise the British occupation of Hong Kong, other than briefly describing Hong Kong as a military base of Britain:

Major British military bases in the area include Aden, Singapore, [...] and Maldiva (sic); these link an important sea route farther to the east with Hongkong as the terminal for shipping colonial troops to the east to suppress national-liberation movements."¹⁰⁸

At least in the *Peking Review*, the CCP did not attack the British authorities in Hong Kong until mid 1967. *Peking Review* in May carried the Chinese Foreign Ministry's strong protest with the British Government against a violent suppression of patriotic Chinese activists by the British authorities in Hong Kong.¹⁰⁹ Although the protest denounced the British government as pursuing a violent anti-China policy with the United States, it did not mention British colonialism in Hong Kong:

[...] the atrocities perpetrated by the British authorities in Hongkong are the result of long premeditation and are a component part of the British Government's scheme of collusion with U.S. imperialism against China. [...]. The Chinese Government demands in all seriousness that the British Government instruct the British authorities in Hong Kong as follows: Immediately accept all the just demands put forward by Chinese workers and residents in Hongkong; Immediately stop all fascist measures; Immediately set free all the arrested persons (including workers, journalists and cameramen); Punish the culprits responsible for there sanguinary atrocities, offer apologies to the victims and compensate for all their losses; and Guarantee against the occurrence of similar incidents.¹¹⁰

This Chinese rhetorical strategy indicated that, even at this stage, China made efforts not to bring about serious confrontation with the British government over colonialism in Hong

¹⁰⁸'British strategy east of Suez' in *PR* No.10, 4 March 1966, p.19.

¹⁰⁹'Chinese government lodges most urgent and strongest protest with British government' in *PR* No.21, 19 May 1967, pp.14-15.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*

Kong. That ultimately meant that Beijing admitted British occupation of Hong Kong, while denouncing colonialism and neo-colonialism in general.

Even after the Chinese official publications explicitly denounced the British government as colonialist, the rhetoric was somewhat ambiguous in terms of anti-imperialist protests:

If you (the British government) persist in being hostile to the Chinese people to the end, then you must bear all the grave consequences arising therefrom.¹¹¹

If the CCP were thoroughly revolutionary and were devotedly supporting Hong Kong's national liberation struggle, Beijing would have conveyed to London more direct words, such as "Get out of Hong Kong." In addition, China never chose to use the military option of driving Britain out by force. Although the CCP had said that Hong Kong was a part of Chinese territory in mid 1967 (see the latter part of this section), Beijing maintained its stance not to intervene militarily outside 1950 borders (except over boundary questions). To China, like the case in Vietnam, extension of military power abroad meant imperialism.

A Red Guard article described the history of British aggression into China since 1837 and criticised it:

In this almost hundred years, since British imperialism dominated our Hong Kong, (British imperialism) has changed Hong Kong to a dark hell of the people. [...]. [We will] take revenge; down with British imperialism!¹¹²

The phrase "a dark hell of the people" gives the image of imperialism, which is the "root of all evil." Some Red Guards showed increasing hostility against "British imperialism."

The fact that Zhou Enlai instructed Red Guards "let's criticize but not too much"¹¹³ in relation to their violent actions in August¹¹⁴ contradicted the briefly dominant assertion of armed struggles against imperialism. He emphasised the importance of rather moderate policy which had been advocated by Chinese leaders, including Mao, since early 1967 (see

¹¹¹'Strongest protest against British imperialist armed provocation along the border' in *PR* No.29, 14 July 1967, p.35.

¹¹²'Yingdi qinhua zuì'è shǐ [The evil history of British imperialist aggression in China]' in *Waishi Fenglei*, 14 July 1967, pp.5-6, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4395.

¹¹³Robinson in Robinson (ed.), p.263.

¹¹⁴Gurtov in Robinson (ed.), p.352. and Cradock, pp.59-70.

below). According to a Japanese newspaper, in September 1967, Zhou issued six restrictions on the Red Guard faction which had burnt down the office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing in August:

(1) it (the Red Guard faction) should not beat up foreigners; (2) it should not destroy buildings; (3) it should not set fire to buildings and cars; (4) it should not intrude into buildings; (5) it should not obstruct, and (6) when it stages struggles against embassies, it can go as far as the gates of embassies and it should not enter further.¹¹⁵

His instructions were displayed on wall newspapers in Beijing.¹¹⁶ Shortly before Zhou's instructions were given, *Guangming Ribao* in Beijing reported an article that insisted upon the importance of theoretical criticism rather than violence that would not "touch people to their souls," while dealing with internal struggles.¹¹⁷ These peaceful attitudes towards imperialism had been harshly denounced by Maoists as being revisionist until then, although, in spring, Mao himself said, "We should carry out struggles in a more civilized manner."¹¹⁸

Even though the advocacy of the peaceful line was opposite to the line that the CCP had verbally insisted on, the strategy was necessary to calm down Hong Kong revolutionaries. The CCP seemed to be afraid that escalation of the riots might lead to a serious destruction of Sino-British relations that had brought and would continue to bring great economic benefits to China. The CCP probably never wished to have a serious military clash with Britain, especially in Hong Kong, which is geographically a part of China. China

¹¹⁵'Chou En-lai shows six conditions for Red Guards' struggles against foreigners' in *Sankei Shimbun*, 5 September 1967, translated in *DSJP*, Sep 67, 6 September 1967, p.11.

Another Japanese newspaper, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, reported that Zhou had given the "five prohibitions" on

"(1) violent action; (2) raids; (3) entering into buildings, investigating there, and confiscating things; (4) setting fire, and (5) destruction," and a demarcation that indicated that "when they (Red Guards) press as far as in front of the gates of organs of foreign countries stationed there, they should draw a line there, and not enter beyond the line." See 'Chou En-lai instructed restraints on direct protest against foreign organs' in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 3 September 1967, translated in *DSJP*, Sep 67, 6 September 1967, p.15.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p.11.

¹¹⁷'Mobilize the masses to stop violent struggle' in *Guangming Ribao*, 14 August 1967, in *Survey* No.4016, 7 September 1967, p.7.

¹¹⁸'Chou En-lai instructed restraints on direct protest against foreign organs' in *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 3 September 1967, translated in *DSJP*, Sep 67, 6 September 1967, p.15.

could have fought against Britain if the CCP had devotedly followed its assertion of armed struggles against imperialism. Unlike the case of the Vietnam War, China had declared that Hong Kong was a part of the Chinese territory.¹¹⁹ The Maoists, however, did not choose the thorough anti-imperialist line, and sought to look after their own national interests and security instead.

Thus the rhetorical strategies of the CCP in the Sino-French relationships and over the British domination of Hong Kong revealed Chinese nationalist sentiment that usually gave its country's interest and security priority over support for anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and national liberation movements. Even when China's foreign policy became more radical in 1967, the radicalism was nearly always restrained by considerations of national interest. The gap between the militant rhetoric and the moderate action was significant.

1.4. Denunciation of revisionist diplomacy

One of the stated purposes of the Cultural Revolution in China was to sweep away revisionism within the Chinese Communist Party. In order to denounce revisionists, the Maoists of China sometimes accused "revisionists" of damaging China's image abroad. The revolutionary image of China was quite important for the Maoists to keep, because, given their previously mentioned concerns with national interest, their break with the "revisionist" USSR and so on, they wanted China to be a leader of world revolution.¹²⁰ The main targets of those denunciations were Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and Chen Yi, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister.

Their friendly tour around Indonesia in April 1963 became one of the main targets of criticism during the Cultural Revolution. The friendly exchange with the then Indonesian President Sukarno was regarded by the Maoists as revisionist, because the Sukarno

¹¹⁹'Hongkong is Chinese territory' in *PR* No.35, 25 August 1967, p.21.

¹²⁰'Mao Zedong guanyu "zhanlüe bushu" de jianghua [Mao Zedong's speech on "strategic plan"]' by *Shaoshan* Editorial Department, September 1967, quoted in *Feiqing Yanjiu* No.15, 30 March 1968, p.92, in *Important talks by Mao Zedong*, filed material (A.D. Hope Library, The Australian National University)

government was defined as bourgeois in late 1960s. In addition, disputes between Chen Yi and the Maoists over the question of exporting Mao Zedong Thought also led to harsh denunciations of Chen Yi.

In this chapter I will examine how much importance the Maoists attached to China's image abroad and what kinds of difference there were between the "revisionists" and the "Maoists" in their points of view on China's place in the world.

Chinese "revisionists" were harshly criticised by revolutionary Communist leaders and Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution for trying to maintain peaceful relationships with overseas imperialism and revisionism. Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi were two of the Chinese leaders most strictly criticised for their "revisionist" foreign policies which, from Chinese revolutionaries' points of view, gave a bad image of revolutionary China overseas.

Liu Shaoqi was attacked for disgracing the Chinese people by pursuing counter-revolutionary foreign policy:

According to Chairman Mao's teachings, the foreign policy of our socialist country can only firmly cling to the internationalist spirit of the proletariat by staging large-scale rebellions against imperialism, revisionism and reaction, and supporting the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples and nations. However, counter-revolutionary revisionist Liu Shao-ch'i carried out an out-and-out revisionist foreign policy, prostrated at the feet of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism, made the great Chinese people lose face, and brought disgrace to the heroes who fought bloody battles against US imperialism, Soviet revisionism and their lackeys and heroically laid down their lives. The towering crimes committed by him against the world (sic) people cannot be cleansed with all the water of the Pacific Ocean.¹²¹

Speeches given by Liu from the late 1950s to the early 1960s were the main targets for the attacks, partly because many of the speeches praised the Soviet Union as a model of a

¹²¹'Carrying out the revisionist foreign policy, making every effort to extol US imperialism and Soviet revisionism, catering for the bourgeois order, and causing the great Chinese people to lose face' in pamphlet, published by the Liaison Station "Pledging to fight a bloody battle with Liu-Deng-Tao to the end" attached to August 18 Red Rebel Regiment of Nankai University, April 1967, in *SCMM* No.653, May 5 1969, p.10.

successful socialist country. As far as China's aim was to pursue the socialist revolution through to the end, it was supposed to be effective for China to make its commitment to the revolution appeal to the rest of the world by attacking the "revisionist" Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was portrayed in many Chinese articles not only as a revisionist country that failed to keep on fighting against imperialism, but also as a major enemy that had betrayed revolutionary countries and the people of the world.

Moreover, Liu was criticised for carrying out pro-bourgeois diplomacy with Chen Yi and his wife in Indonesia in 1963, which resulted in "bringing disgrace to the great Chinese people."¹²² Even though the Indonesian government of the day was anti-imperialist and had been improving its relations with China, having diplomatic dealings with the "bourgeois" Sukarno government became a charge that Chinese revolutionaries made against Liu during the Cultural Revolution.

Needless to say, Liu was also denounced as pro-US. In an article in *Hongqi*, he was implicitly said to be asking US imperialism for peace.¹²³ According to his accusers, to seek for compromise and peaceful discussion with the imperialists could never be allowed either within and outside China. Moreover, the Chinese revolutionaries might have thought that Liu's attitude seemed as if the Chinese people were flattering the imperialists.

Wang Guangmei, wife of Liu Shaoqi, was publicly interrogated by a group of Red Guards. She was accused of having acted in unsuitable ways as a Chinese diplomat when she visited Indonesia in 1963:

You (Wang) went to Indonesia with those clothes on and ganged up with

Sukarno, and disgraced the Chinese people, and also humiliated all Chinese.¹²⁴

The Red Guards meant that the clothes which she wore at that time were very bourgeois and she was too friendly to Sukarno, who turned out to be an enemy of the people. It is interesting to note that the Red Guards said she had "disgraced the Chinese people" and "humiliated all Chinese," because these terms showed that Chinese revolutionaries cared

¹²²Ibid., p.15.

¹²³'Aiguo zhuyi haishi maiguo zhuyi? [patriotism or national betrayal?]' in *HQ* No.5, 30 March 1967, p.13.

¹²⁴'Sanshen da pashou Wang Guangmei [Three trials of the big pickpocket, Wang Guangmei]' (pamphlet), in *Xingdao Ribao*, 3 March 1968, in *Liu Shaoqi*, Filed material (A.D. Hope Library, The Australian National University)

about China's image overseas. The Red Guards also criticised Wang for disgracing Chinese people by lighting Sukarno's cigarette.¹²⁵ Even though picking up those sorts of "crimes" might not have been the main thing on which the Red Guards wanted to concentrate, the criticisms revealed the Red Guards' pride and confidence that China was the centre of world revolution by disputing Sukarno's claim to the position of leading "Third World" advocate. Those criticisms of course indirectly targeted Liu Shaoqi.

Leftist Chinese diplomats, Yao Dengshan and Zhao Xiaoshou, who were in Indonesia during the friendly tours by the Chinese leaders, also criticised Wang's "bad attitudes" in Indonesia. According to them, Wang's behaviour and the style of dress were quite bourgeois.¹²⁶ By criticising Wang in that way, Yao and Zhao tried to suggest that revolutionary China's image in Indonesia might have deteriorated because of her. To these two revolutionaries, China had to manifest its revolutionary character to the rest of the world both in words and behaviour in order to attain the status of the world "revolutionary" leader.

Chen Yi was also one of the CCP leaders who were dealing with foreign affairs and he too received significant verbal attacks. He was denounced as having disgraced the Chinese people through "despicable activities" during his tour with Liu in 1963.¹²⁷ His "revisionist diplomatic line" was also said by many Red Guards to have disgraced the "great Chinese people."¹²⁸ Against the fact that Chen said in 1963 that President Sukarno was his commander, a Red Guard article criticised him as follows:

Does Chen Yi still have even a bit of proletarian principle and national pride?¹²⁹

These criticisms of Chen revealed the Red Guards' concern over China's international image.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶'Zai guoji shang tuixing touxiang zhuyi de huochou ju' in *RMRB*, 13 July 1967, p.4.

¹²⁷'Paoda Chen Yi, jiefang waishikou [Bombard Chen Yi, liberate the foreign affairs section]', in *Hongqi*, 4 April 1967, p.4, in *RGP* Vol.6, p.1567.

¹²⁸'Yinni fandong pai mianqian de pasi gui [A coward in front of the Indonesian reactionary clique]' in *Waishi Fenglei*, 14 July 1967, p.3, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4394.

¹²⁹'Chen Yi he Sujianuo [Chen Yi and Sukarno] in *Pi Chen Zhanbao*', 1 August 1967, p.4, in *RGP* Vol.11, p.3283.

What, then, was the difference between the Maoists and the "revisionists" in policy on imperialism? Did Mao and Zhou adopt a more militant policy towards the imperialists? It seemed that there was little difference between them in policy on imperialism. Both Mao and Liu, in actuality, wanted "peaceful coexistence" with the United States.

Mao said, "We are at once internationalists and patriots, [...]."¹³⁰ In his theory, China was supposed to struggle against powers which opposed the interests of the people of the world, while also seeking its own benefits in international relations. In practice, however, the latter part of the actual willingness of China's leaders to commit the nation to active participation in other countries' "struggles" appears to have been very limited, and theory seemed to be more emphasised. Through the 1960s, with Zhou Enlai's support, Mao strove to save China from being isolated in the world by winning "Third World" countries over to China's side.

However, China's interests did not necessarily match the interests of revolutionaries of the "Third World" countries. Van Ness has pointed out that China, in order to further its own interests, tried to maintain friendly relations with some foreign non-communist governments such as the Burmese government, which was under attack by local revolutionaries.¹³¹ For instance, both Zhou and the then Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Burma for friendly exchange in 1965.¹³² Interestingly, Zhou said to a Pakistani journalist that China was ready to improve relations between China and the United States peacefully:

The only way to improve Sino-American relations is for the U.S. government to prove by deeds its willingness to change its hostile policy toward China. We would welcome the helpful efforts in this direction by our friends who are willing to offer their good offices between China and the United States.¹³³

Thus Mao thought it was important for China to emphasise to some extent that Chinese people were peace-loving and did not want war if it could be avoided, while

¹³⁰Mao Zedong, 'Patriotism and internationalism', *Selected works of Mao Tse-tung* Vol.II (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1967), p.196.

¹³¹Van Ness, pp.97-101.

¹³²Ibid., p.98.

¹³³'Zhou Enlai zongli da Bajisitan lianhe tongxunshe shouxi jizhe wen [Chinese Premier answers Pakistan Correspondent]' in *RMRB*, 27 February 1964, from *Xinhua*, 26 February 1964, in *Survey* No.3169, 2 March 1964, p.30.

asserting that Chinese people would not be afraid of war if necessary. China needed to express its wish for peace, especially after its successful nuclear experiment in 1964, in order not to terrify the rest of the world and not to arouse excessive hostility against China.

Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi were following the same policy as Mao and Zhou. Melvin Gurtov concluded that Chen Yi was "faithfully" following Mao's points of view in foreign policy.¹³⁴ Mao, Zhou and Liu had the same points of view on US imperialism and both Zhou and Liu followed Mao's united front policy. They also shared the same perspective on peaceful coexistence with other countries. In addition, an appeal by Liu and Chen for "peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition of the Khrushchev style"¹³⁵ in Indonesia in 1963 was exactly the same as what Mao and Zhou had said was important, even though Liu and Chen were later denounced as revisionists for that.

It can be said, through the criticisms of Liu and Chen, that the Maoists' nationalistic feelings largely reflected their points of view on China's role in the world revolution. Even though the Maoists denounced the "revisionists" for having compromised with imperialism, the policy of Mao and Zhou was the same as that of the "revisionists" in terms of avoiding direct conflict with the United States and the Soviet Union. The Maoists also chose to avoid direct violent struggle against enemies. It seemed that there was a tacit understanding between the Maoists and the "revisionists" in the CCP, at least before 1966, as regards publicising China's contrasting images: militant against enemies but peace-loving by nature.

¹³⁴Gurtov in Robinson (ed.), p.322.

¹³⁵'Zai guoji shang tuixing touxiangzhuyi de huochou ju [Lively farce of internationally pursuing capitulationism]' in *RMRB*, 13 July 1967, p.4.

Chapter Two:

The Mao cult

2.1. The highest peak of Marxism-Leninism

In the latter part of the 1960s, Mao Zedong Thought was often praised by Maoists all over the world. In their publications, the CCP and other Chinese Maoists, such as Red Guards, promoted Mao Zedong Thought by emphasising its "contribution" to the history of Marxism-Leninism. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial on the 22 April 1966 said:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has made great contributions to enriching and developing the philosophy and economics of Marxism-Leninism, and the Marxist-Leninist theories of class struggle, the proletarian political party and military affairs. Mao Tse-tung's thinking marks a new stage of development in Marxism-Leninism. It is the highest peak of Marxism-Leninism in our epoch.¹³⁶

The purpose of this section is not to discuss whether or not the Maoist propaganda was correct, or what Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism were, but to examine the way that the Maoists praised Mao Zedong Thought as the acme of Marxism-Leninism and thereby to promote an image of China as the ideological leader of the world revolution. As Marxism-Leninism was more recognised worldwide than Mao Zedong Thought, it seems that the Maoists particularly insisted on Mao Zedong Thought as the highest form of Marxism-Leninism, because the Maoists needed to justify China's claim to be the true heir of the former leader's role of the USSR. In the latter half of the 1960s, the articles/statements on Marxism-Leninism in Chinese publications revealed the Maoist aim of justifying Mao Zedong Thought in terms of Marxism-Leninism:

¹³⁶In putting politics first, one must constantly put Mao Tse-tung's thinking in command' in *PR* No.20, 13 May 1966, p.44.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's great merit lies in the fact that he has succeeded in integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and has enriched and developed Marxism-Leninism by his masterly generalization and summation of the experience gained during the Chinese people's protracted revolutionary struggle.¹³⁷

Mao Tse-tung's thinking is the summit of Marxism-Leninism in the present era, the most powerful weapon in our struggle to defeat bourgeois and revisionist ideology.¹³⁸

Our great teacher, great leader, great commander, great helmsman, Chairman Mao, is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time. Chairman Mao has, with the gifts of genius, creatively, thoroughly inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism, and he improved Marxism-Leninism to an entirely new stage.¹³⁹

Their point was that Mao Zedong Thought was very good because it developed Marxism-Leninism through revolutionary practice. For example, Lin Biao mentioned China's anti-Japanese war from 1937 to 1945 as a "victory for Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung."¹⁴⁰

According to a Chinese Maoist, Ren Lixin, Mao Zedong was specifically significant because he was the first person who succeeded in keeping a socialist revolution alive while avoiding "revisionist" backsliding, an accomplishment which had been the aim of all the Chinese Marxist-Leninists in the past:

The proletariat must use violent revolution to smash the old state apparatus and replace it with the proletarian dictatorship. However, the problems arising after the proletariat seize power, how to maintain and consolidate the proletarian

¹³⁷'Long live the victory of people's war!' in *PR* No.36, 3 September 1965, p.10.

¹³⁸'Put politics first, promote a new upsurge in industrial production' in *PR* No.19, 6 May 1966, p.27.

¹³⁹'Mao Zedong Sixiang guanghui puzhao quan shijie [The light of Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the whole world]' in *RMRB*, 4 October 1966, p.6.

¹⁴⁰'Long live the victory of people's war!' in *PR* No.36, 3 September 1965, p.10.

dictatorship, how to prevent capitalist restoration, and how to pursue the socialist revolution through to the end, had never been solved by any of all the Marxist-Leninists of the older generation. The Marxist-Leninists had never been able to settle these problems, but the greatest Marxist-Leninist in the present era, our great leader, Chairman Mao, has solved those problems [...].¹⁴¹

In *Hongqi*, a Chinese general Yang Chengwu, insisted on Mao's contribution to Marxism-Leninism in China as follows:

Mao Zedong Thought instilled Marxism-Leninism into the masses, [...].¹⁴²

Through advertising Mao's "great" success in the Chinese socialist revolution, which was said to be led by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Maoists asserted that Mao Zedong was also the ideological leader of the international proletarian revolution. In June 1966, a *Renmin Ribao* editorial wrote:

The reason why Chairman Mao enjoys extremely high prestige among the revolutionary people of the world is because he has, with the gift of genius, creatively, thoroughly, comprehensively and systematically developed Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung's thought is not only an integration of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, but also an integration of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the world revolution.¹⁴³

Yang also claimed that Mao Zedong Thought was originally the same as Marxism-Leninism.¹⁴⁴ A *Renmin Ribao* editorial wrote:

The nature of Marxism-Leninism is criticism and revolution. Its basic point is the necessity of criticism, struggle and revolution.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹'Zhengan shijie de wenhua dageming [The earth-shattering great cultural revolution]' in *RMRB*, 22 April 1967, p.3.

¹⁴²'Dashu teshu weida tongshuai Mao zhuxi de juehui quanwei, dashu teshu weida Mao Zedong Sixiang de juehui quanwei [Largely promote absolute authority of the great commander Chairman Mao, largely promote absolute authority of great Mao Zedong Thought]' in *HQ* No.16, 1967, p.35.

¹⁴³'Mao Zedong Sixiang shi shijie renmin geming de dengta [Mao Tse-tung's thought--Beacon of revolution for the world's people]' in *RMRB*, 1 June 1966, p.4. (English translations for both the title and text are from *PR* No.23, 3 June 1966, p.6.)

¹⁴⁴'Dashu teshu weida tongshuai Mao zhuxi de juehui quanwei, dashu teshu weida Mao Zedong Sixiang de juehui quanwei [Largely promote absolute authority of the great commander Chairman Mao, largely promote absolute authority of great Mao Zedong Thought]' in *HQ* No.16, 1967, p.37.

The CCP repeatedly insisted on the need for criticism and struggle during the Cultural Revolution.

The Mao cult prospered through its claim to have raised Marxism-Leninism to a new level. Some Chinese said that Mao Zedong Thought was the "only" theory which continued to practise Marxism-Leninism. For example, Yang said that a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary was bound to be a Maoist:

If you are a revolutionary and a Marxist-Leninist, then you must support the great leader Chairman Mao and must support invincible Mao Zedong Thought, [...].¹⁴⁶

On the assumption that Mao Zedong Thought was the developed form of Marxism-Leninism, a *Renmin Ribao* editorial declared:

Only by strictly keeping Mao Tse-tung's thinking in command, can revolutionary people have a clear-cut and firm political direction, persistently maintain a vigorous revolutionary spirit, recognize objective laws through practice and work in harmony with these laws; only in this way can our socialist cause advance steadily and be ever victorious.¹⁴⁷

The effect of this was to suggest that non-Maoist communist parties were not really socialist, which has a profound effect on international relations rhetoric by focussing attention on the failures of the Soviet Union (rather than capitalism).

In order to indicate that Mao Zedong Thought enjoyed worldwide recognition as the "standard" Marxism-Leninism, Chinese publications printed many foreign comments which praised Mao Zedong as the great Marxist-Leninist, and Mao Zedong Thought as pure Marxism-Leninism :

[...] all Genuine Marxist-Leninists of our era assimilate Mao Tse-tung's thought and take it as the guide to revolutionary action. (Editorial by Jacques Grippa,

¹⁴⁵'Women shi jiu shijie de pipanzhe [We are critics of the old world]' in *RMRB*, 8 June 1966, p.1.

¹⁴⁶'Dashu teshu weida tongshuai Mao zhuxi de juegui quanwei, dashu teshu weida Mao Zedong Sixiang de juegui quanwei [Largely promote absolute authority of the great commander Chairman Mao, largely promote absolute authority of great Mao Zedong Thought]' in *HQ* No.16, 1967, p.30.

¹⁴⁷'In putting politics first, one must constantly put Mao Tse-tung's thinking in command' in *PR* No.20, 13 May 1966, p.43.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belgian Communist Party, published in the weekly *La Voix du Peuple*)¹⁴⁸

Lenin and Mao Tse-tung are the two greatest men of the 20th century. It is wonderful that two such great men have emerged in one century. This has changed the face of the world. (The director of the Lebanese paper, *Beirut Al-Masa*)¹⁴⁹

Experience in the cultural revolution proves that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thought is the highest expression of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism in the present historical era. It is the most reliable guide for carrying forward the revolutionary struggle in all conditions and in all countries. (The Central Committee of the Italian Marxist-Leninist Movement in a recent communique)¹⁵⁰

Mao Tse-tung is as great as Lenin. He is the Lenin of our time and we love him dearly. (One old teacher at the Chinese exhibition of works of art in Arad, Rumania)¹⁵¹

Moreover, some foreign communist parties declared that they would apply Mao Zedong Thought to revolution in their countries:

The Peruvian Communist Party, when referring to the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions to the Peruvian revolution, includes Mao Tse-tung's thought in Marxism-Leninism.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸'China's Great Cultural Revolution is Chairman Mao's magnificent and great achievement' in *PR* No.39, 23 September 1966, p.20.

¹⁴⁹'An account of the visits of foreign friends to the Museum of the Chinese Revolution' in *PR* No.40, 30 September 1966, p.20.

¹⁵⁰'The world's revolutionary people hail China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' in *PR* No.40, 30 September 1966, p.27.

¹⁵¹'The hearts of the world's revolutionary people are with Chairman Mao' in *PR* No.43, 21 October 1966, p.15.

¹⁵²'Peruvian Communist Party warmly hails victory of China's Great Cultural Revolution and of Mao Tse-tung's thought' in *PR* No.39, 23 September 1966, p.21.

As we have seen thus far, Marxism-Leninism tended to be referred to in order to give the people an impression that Mao Zedong Thought was the correct and standard theory for the international proletarian revolution of the time. Even though this CCP propaganda might have largely targeted the promotion of the Cultural Revolution at home, the stress on Mao Zedong Thought as the apex of Marxism-Leninism also revealed a Maoist strategy to spread Mao Zedong Thought through the world. This was illustrated by the printing of foreigners' "favourable" comments on Mao Zedong Thought. (Needless to say, no unfavourable comments appeared.) In Chinese official publications, Mao Zedong Thought thus became the "universal truth" of the proletarian revolution. By trying to present an international rather than a Chinese framework for Maoism, the CCP wanted to imply that China was now the true inheritor of the traditions of Marxism-Leninism.

2.2. Export of Mao cult and Mao Zedong Thought as having global support

Maoist enthusiasm for developing the image of China

Edgar Snow, an American journalist who was very close to Mao Zedong wrote in *Red China today*:

Mao was part Leninist, part Stalinist---and all Chinese.¹⁵³

Chinese revolutionary leaders, such as Maoists in the CCP and Red Guards, while "wishing to promote" the international proletarian revolution, were also interested in their country's image and status in the world. In Chinese publications, although many articles and statements appeared advocating the necessity of world revolution, there were articles which revealed nationalist sentiment which regarded Mao-led China as a model revolutionary country. These articles, through praise for Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, tried to

¹⁵³Snow, Edgar, *Red China today*--revised and updated edition of *The other side of the river* (Random House, New York, 1970), p.635.

demonstrate that there was a favourable international image of China. What seemed to be emphasised was that Mao Zedong was the representative of China and that he was loved by people all over the world. There was little reference to revolutionary theory or strategies in some of these articles.

Different groups of Red Guards published unofficially a number of different magazines, especially from 1967 to 1968. In these magazines, some of the Red Guard groups were keen to publicise the international popularity of Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought. It also appears that those Red Guards believed that China was popular among the people abroad. However, the reality was that China's image was growing worse in non-left sections of the population in capitalist developed countries (non-Maoist sections of communist and socialist parties in some countries, such as Japan) and in the Soviet bloc, partly because Chinese foreign policy had become so radical. The Cultural Revolution was also criticised by many other countries and communist and socialist parties. Thus the Mao cult reached its peak in China when China was seen by most of the world as being difficult to deal with.

In this first part of the section, I will examine the relationship between the Mao cult and nationalist expressions by Red Guards and the CCP in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution.

Firstly, we will look at the cult of personality. There were Red Guard articles that spoke only of foreigners' "boundless love" for Mao Zedong, without any other content. In this way, Mao Zedong was portrayed as if he were a god to be worshipped, rather than as a commander or revolutionary leader. In a Red Guard paper, there was an article about a Tanzanian delegate who had met Mao Zedong in China. According to the article, after meeting Mao, the Tanzanian went back to his country leaving his hand unwashed and said to whoever he met, "Chairman Mao shook hands with me, now you shake hands with me!"¹⁵⁴ The article continued:

¹⁵⁴ 'Mao zhuxi shi shijie geming renmin xinzhong de hong taiyang [Chairman Mao is the red sun in hearts of the world revolutionary people]' in *Waishi Hongqi*, 4 June 1967, p.4, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4405.

Another delegate went to Shaoshan (Mao's birthplace in Hunan Province) and specially brought back a package of sand from Chairman Mao's hometown as a souvenir.¹⁵⁵

Another extreme story of the Mao cult was about an old Vietnamese man:

Heroic Vietnamese people regard the Chairman Mao badge as the most precious thing in the world. Workers in a coastal defence harbour were working very hard one day in winter. Suddenly, an overseas Chinese worker carelessly dropped a Chairman Mao badge into the sea. At that moment, an old Vietnamese worker dived into the ice-cold sea with a splash, not taking the time to take off his clothes. He did not get the badge at the first dive so made a second dive after taking a breath at the surface of the water. In this way, it was only after three dives that he managed to find the glittering Chairman Mao badge. After going ashore, despite the fact that his whole body was frozen over so badly that its color had begun turning purple, he, with great effort, said to other workers, "Chairman Mao is the leader of the people of the whole world, I love him so much!"¹⁵⁶

This story may have been written mainly to encourage the Mao cult among overseas Chinese. But it still seems to also reveal the writer's intention of showing how deeply Mao was loved by the peoples of the world. In addition, by showing that the Vietnamese people loved China's leader too, the story implicitly tried to enhance the status of the Chinese people who declared loyalty to Mao.

In Paris, an old French woman went to a Chinese exhibition. When a Chinese staff member spoke of "[...] our great leader Chairman Mao [...]," the woman said to the staff member, "What? Your Chairman Mao? No! Chairman Mao is not only yours, he belongs to all the people of the world!"¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶'Mao zhuxi a, shijie renmin reai nin! [Chairman Mao, the world people love you so much!]' in *Pi Chen Zhanbao*, 1 July 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.11, p.3279.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

Next, we will look at some Red Guard articles emphasising the fact that Mao Zedong was a Chinese and that Mao Zedong Thought was produced in China:

China's red sun is rising! China has produced a Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong Thought and the concrete practices of the Chinese revolution are linked to each other. This is why, in China, this great country on earth, the revolution has succeeded [...].¹⁵⁸

The above quote was attributed to an "American friend," named Rittenberg.¹⁵⁹

Today, in the East Asian region, around the famous Yangzi River, along the ancient Yellow River, there is a raging torch burning. She is the hope of all human beings, and the beacon of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of every country! She is the eternal torch of Mao Zedong Thought!¹⁶⁰

This revealed a portrayal of China as the "birthplace" of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought were firmly linked with the image of China. The "correctness" of Mao's approach to revolution is given a direct relationship to China as a territory and nation.

It is interesting to note why the Red Guard writer of the quote above used "she," but did not use either "it" or "he," to indicate Mao Zedong Thought. There are a few different reasons we can think of. First of all, the writer might have wanted to portray Mao Zedong Thought as a character who could strongly influence the peoples of the world. Then, why should it be female? One of the possible reasons is that the writer might have been careful not to "create" another "hero" other than Mao Zedong himself. Another is that the writer might have linked the image of Mao Zedong Thought with "motherland" China, whom the revolutionary peoples of the world should respect and rely upon. Or it can be said that Mao Zedong Thought was portrayed as the "goddess of victory" who would lead the peoples of the world to a victory in the international proletarian revolution.

Lastly, we will look at Mao's "contribution" to the international "popularity" of China. *Peking Review* printed some stories aimed at showing improvements in China's

¹⁵⁸'Chuangchu yi ge hongtongtong de gongchanzhuyi xin shijie lai [Break through to a new red communist world]' in *Hongqi*, 21 May 1967, p.6, in *RGP Vol.6*, p.1603.

¹⁵⁹Sidney Rittenberg

¹⁶⁰'Mao zhuxi, quan shijie renmin xinzhong de hong taiyang [Chairman Mao, the red sun in hearts of the people of the whole world]' in *Hongqi*, 21 May 1968, p.4, in *RGP Vol.6*, p.1655.

image abroad. For example, there was an article about an experience of a Chinese medical team sent to Mauritania that happened to save a local baby's life. The baby's father, with his baby, visited the Chinese medical team a few days after an extremely delicate operation:

Fondly caressing the child, the father kept muttering: "Chinois, Chinois (meaning Chinese)." A Chinese medical worker asked him curiously why he kept saying the word to his child. "But that's his name," the father replied. "My child was dying the other day and was saved by the Chinese medical team sent here by Chairman Mao. So I changed my child's name to 'Chinois' from that day." He then shouted enthusiastically: "Long live Chairman Mao!"¹⁶¹

Another article in *Peking Review* said:

People in the Asian-African countries are deeply aware from their own personal experience that only Mao Tse-tung's China can help them build their countries in such a disinterested way, that only the Chinese people nurtured on Mao Tse-tung's thought can serve the people of the world heart and soul with such boundless warmth. They thank the Chinese experts and workers for their industrious efforts, and they express the deepest gratitude to Chairman Mao.¹⁶²

Although the article incorporated revolutionary points of view, it obviously revealed Chinese Maoist sentiment which regarded Mao Zedong Thought as almighty in terms of serving to the peoples.

The promotion of patriotic expressions by Chinese Maoists seems to have coincided with the Maoists' opposition to the USSR. The following articles seem to have been trying to portray the people of the USSR as now beginning to follow Mao Zedong, instead of the "revisionist" CPSU.

[A] Soviet sailor told a Chinese comrade: "[...]. Every time I think of him (Mao) I am unable to restrain myself from humming the tune 'The east is red. The sun rises. China has brought forth a Mao Tse-tung [...].'"¹⁶³

¹⁶¹'Thank Chairman Mao for sending us such fine doctors!' in *PR* No.47, 22 November 1968, p.18.

¹⁶²'Internationalist fighters in the service of the world's people' in *PR* No.5, 27 January 1967, p.23.

¹⁶³'The desire of the Soviet people and the people the world over' in *PR* No.10, 8 March 1968, p.26.

A Soviet youth pointed out that Chinese revolutionary songs have encouraged the Soviet people to wage struggles. He said he would sing the praises of Mao Tse-tung's thought for ever.¹⁶⁴

These "facts" indicated that the CCP was trying to portray that the CPSU was losing its power even over the Soviet people. That was supposed to mean that Mao Zedong and the Chinese people were the new force to guide the world revolution.

Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese publications printed many articles that were closely connected to the Mao cult. The Maoist point of view was that China was loved by the people of the world, because the Chinese people were good revolutionary models who were firmly led by the world's revolutionary leader, Chairman Mao. These articles seem to create the impression that there was enthusiasm among Chinese people to take on a role of socialist leadership in the world, instead of the former leader, the USSR.

Export of Mao Zedong Thought and the Cultural Revolution

From 1966 to 1968, the Chinese press and magazines extensively reported that Mao Zedong Thought had been spreading all over the world.

From one continent to another, the revolutionary peoples, regardless of differences in nationality, language and colour, are united in their love for Chairman Mao and their earnest desire to study his works.¹⁶⁵

Many of the reports tried to show how deeply the people or the revolutionary organisations of other countries admired Mao Zedong and how firmly they resolved to follow Mao Zedong Thought. It seemed as if Mao Zedong Thought had largely affected the people of the world in terms of anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggles. As noted above, Mao Zedong was often said to have improved Marxism-Leninism. And his improvement was said to be breaking its link with imperialism which the Soviet Union had failed to do.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p.27.

¹⁶⁵"The brilliance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought illuminates the whole world' in *PR* No.27, 1 July 1966, p.13.

Even so, the CCP propaganda carefully avoided stating explicitly that China was the leader of world revolution. Although Mao Zedong Thought was claimed by the Chinese as the thought that led the revolutionary people of the world, the CCP did not describe China itself as a world leader. Neither did they clearly insist that the peoples of the world *should* follow Mao Zedong Thought. If they did, it would have violated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,¹⁶⁶ especially "non-interference in each other's internal affairs," among Asian countries. Instead, the claim to revolutionary leadership was implied. The press and magazines introduced a significant amount of praise of Mao Zedong Thought and of the Chinese people by foreign revolutionaries. It seemed as if China had many friends all over the world.

However, the reality was quite different. Even though China established friendly relations with many foreign governments and organisations in early 1960s, the relationships grew cold and were almost broken off in the mid 1967, largely because of the extremism of the Cultural Revolution in China. The CCP rhetoric came to focus on support for national liberation of the peoples from their "oppressive" governments and hegemonic forces which were allied with US imperialism and/or Soviet "revisionism."

Asahi Shimbun claimed that, even though China was keen to export revolution verbally, the Chinese government did not explicitly claim to lead the revolutionary people of the world¹⁶⁷ --presumably to avoid arousing the hostility of foreign countries.

I will observe how the Chinese official and non-official press and magazines (both Chinese and English language) presented Mao Zedong Thought as the "universal" theory for the revolutionary peoples of the world to follow. From this we can see the image the CCP leaders wanted to maintain on the international stage, the international image that they wished to present to the Chinese population, and Red Guard enthusiasm over export of the Cultural Revolution.

¹⁶⁶A joint statement by Zhou Enlai and Nehru (India) at the Geneva Conference in July 1954. The statement mentioned; (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence among Asian countries.

¹⁶⁷'Chugoku no "Bunkaku yushutsu" gaiko [The "export the Cultural Revolution" diplomacy of China]' in *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 July 1967, p.3.

International publicity for Mao Zedong Thought was carried out by the CCP and other Chinese Maoists enthusiastically, although Foreign Minister Chen Yi was said by Red Guards to have opposed the export of Mao Zedong Thought.¹⁶⁸ In addition to making approaches to leftists, ultra-leftists and various other Maoist organisations abroad, the Chinese press used foreigners' words to introduce how "significantly" Mao Zedong Thought had influenced the people abroad in anti-imperialist struggles and how much the people of the world "loved" Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. For example, *Renmin Ribao* quoted words by a Japanese Maoist:

Mao Zedong Thought belongs not only to China, but also to the people of the world. It is a great power that would overthrow US imperialism and smash modern revisionism, and is a powerful, philosophical and theoretical weapon of the world people.¹⁶⁹

"A Guatemalan friend" said that Mao Zedong Thought was a "mental atomic bomb" and that Guatemalan people would "bring back Mao Zedong Thought" to their country in order to "promote" internal revolution there.¹⁷⁰ "A Thai comrade" said:

The people of my country cannot be without Mao Zedong Thought a moment, exactly as (we) cannot be without food and air.¹⁷¹

Titles like "Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the whole world" and "Warmly hail the world's entry into a new era of Mao Zedong Thought" appeared everywhere in the Chinese press and magazines. Some illustrations show Mao's writings as extremely popular, especially among the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹⁷² For example, one of the illustrations in *Renmin Ribao* of October 1966 shows French people competing with others in buying books written by Mao at the "Chinese Hall" in a world exhibition in Paris.

¹⁶⁸'Paohong Chenyi, dadaowuxiuquan, jiefang waishikou! [Bombard Chenyi, down with revisionist Wu, liberate the foreign affairs section!]' in *Hongwei Zhanbao*, 13 April 1967, p.4. in *RGP* Vol.8, p.2220.

¹⁶⁹'Yazhou xuduo pengyou reqing gesong Mao zhuxi he Mao Zedong Sixiang [Many Asian friends warmly praise Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought]' in *RMRB*, 7 July 1966, p.4.

¹⁷⁰'Yafeila pengyou shuo Mao Zedong Sixiang shi shiyong yu quan shijie de pubian zhenli [Asian, African and Latin American friends say that Mao Zedong Thought is suitable for the universal truth of the whole world]' in *Peking Ribao*, 23 March 1967, p.4.

¹⁷¹'Quan shijie renmin tongsheng gechang hong taiyang [The people of the whole world sing together in praise of the Red Sun]' in *RMRB*, 10 January 1968, p.5.

¹⁷²For example, 'Mao Zedong Sixiang guanghui puzhao quan shijie [Light of Mao Zedong Thought illuminates the whole world]' in *RMRB*, 14 October 1966, p.6.

Another illustration in the same newspaper shows people walking in the mountains. The comment on the picture says that books written by Mao are very popular among Latin American university students. One of the people in the picture is holding a book written by Mao to his breast.

Renmin Ribao published an interview with an American resident in Beijing. In the interview, the American said:

Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the greatest treasure for revolutionaries everywhere.

It is the invincible and indispensable weapon for revolutionaries everywhere and especially and of course in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Once this thought is disseminated and revolutionaries of the world have grasped it, victory in their revolution is certain.¹⁷³

To publicise an American's support for Mao Zedong Thought was to give the impression that US imperialism was isolated even within its own country, and also to show Mao Zedong Thought receiving support from all the peoples of the world without exception. The quote was meant to present Mao Zedong Thought as universal "treasure."

Red Guards, of course, were devoted advocates of the export of Mao Zedong Thought. A group of Red Guards in the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages criticised Chen Yi for saying "Mao Zedong Thought is thoroughly Chinese stuff, we won't bring it abroad"¹⁷⁴ and tried to prove his words were wrong. In their publication, for instance, they reported a talk by a person from the Albanian Labour Party (The Albanian government was the only one which was explicitly allied with Maoism at the time.):

We Albanian people all boundlessly love Chairman Mao. Each of us Albanian people would like to take some years from our own life span and give them to Chairman Mao. Long life to Chairman Mao!¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³'Jen-min Jih-pao interview American comrades in Peking (1): great world significance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought' from Xinhua, 14 March 1967, in *Survey* No.3900, 16 March 1967, p.26.

¹⁷⁴'Paohong Chenyi, dadaowuxiuquan, jiefang waishikou! [Bombard Chenyi, down with revisionist Wu, liberate the foreign affairs section!]' in *Hongwei Zhanbao*, 13 April 1967, p.4. in *RGP* Vol.8, p.2220.

¹⁷⁵'Mao zhuxi a, shijie renmin reai nin! [Chairman Mao, the people of the world deeply love you!]' in *Pi Chen Zhanbao*, 1 July 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.11, p.3279.

Moreover, Red Guard enthusiasm over export of the Cultural Revolution was shown in the following resolutions:

First we will make China red from the inside out and then we will help the working people of other countries make the whole world red.¹⁷⁶

We Red Guards are not only staging an all-out rebellion on the domestic scene, but are ready to step into the international arena to fight to the end and make thoroughgoing rebellions together with the oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world.¹⁷⁷

Based on Chairman Mao's thought, we will struggle against monsters, and will struggle for the whole of China and the people of the world.¹⁷⁸

We Red Guards have been struggling for Chairman Mao's great ideal --- establishing communist societies in the whole world. (Mei Jianming, aged 20, Beijing Institute of Geology)¹⁷⁹

Those Red Guards were firmly convinced that they were the vanguard of the world proletarian revolution and that the Chinese way of revolution should be applied also to the rest of the world.

This Red Guard intention, however, was different from a general policy of the CCP. Although there were some CCP ultra-leftists (such as Yao Dengshan) who insisted on exporting the Chinese way of revolution, the CCP's repeatedly expressed general line of world revolution was that each country should pursue revolution in its own way.

¹⁷⁶Strong, Anna Louise, *Letters from China* (New World Press, Beijing, 1966), quoted in 'China topics,' 25 October 1966, in *China-Political-Cultural Revolution-General 1966/1967* (Australian Archives), Series No: A1838/280, Item No: 3107/2/20/7 Pt3, p.101.

¹⁷⁷*People's Daily*, 9 September 1966, quoted in 'China topics,' 25 October 1966, in *China-Political-Cultural Revolution-General 1966/1967* (Australian Archives), Series No: A1838/280, Item No: 3107/2/20/7 Pt3, p.101.

¹⁷⁸'Koeihei to kataru [Talk with Red Guards]' in *AJ*, Vol.8, No.43, 16 October 1966, p.12.

¹⁷⁹Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview with Red Guards] in *JC* No.5, 1967, p.82.

The publicity for Mao Zedong Thought in the Chinese press and magazines was combined with anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist propaganda. The CCP wanted to make close ties with as many anti-imperialist governments and organisations as possible, but most of the support for Mao Zedong Thought and praise of the Chinese people were from relatively small governments and organisations, and individuals.

The popularity of Mao Zedong Thought was linked to the popularity of Mao himself. *Peking Review* in late 1967 introduced a number of episodes which happened in the Soviet Union:

In Leningrad, a grey haired worker always shouted "Long live Mao Tse-tung!" in Chinese whenever he met a Chinese comrade [...]. "I love Mao Tse-tung. He lives in my heart." Sometimes Chinese comrades heard the shout of "Mao Tse-tung" in the streets in Soviet cities but could not see who was shouting.¹⁸⁰

When Soviet people got a picture of Chairman Mao or a badge with his profile, their faces, without exception, would beam with boundless happiness or they would cheer.¹⁸¹

We can see from comparison of these episodes with CCP denunciations of the CPSU a clear rhetorical distinction between "oppressive" governments and "oppressed" people which was a main component of Maoist writings.

Mao's supposed importance was reinforced in the frequent descriptions of him as fulfilling various leading, educative and combative roles for the nation and its people. This passage from the *Peking Review* is typical:

At 6:30 p.m., our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman Chairman Mao, in high spirits and filled with pleasure, strode into the brightly lit reception hall together with Comrade Lin Piao [...].¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰'The radiance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought illuminates the path of the Soviet people's revolution' in *PR* No.47, 17 November 1967, p.21.

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, p.22.

¹⁸²'Chairman Mao, the red sun in the hearts of the world's people, receives friends from all over the world' in *PR* No.42, 13 October 1967, p.8.

The Mao cult in the press and magazines became greater and greater. The title of the passage, "Chairman Mao, the red sun in the hearts of the world's people," shows a Maoist claim that Mao was not only the leader of faithful Chinese followers but also the leader of the peoples of the world.

Even though it was Mao Zedong Thought and Mao himself and not the Chinese Communist Party that China urged the people of the world to follow, praise of Mao Zedong Thought and Mao also meant praise of the Party. China declared that the Chinese Communist Party was Mao Zedong's party:

Our Party, founded and nurtured by Comrade Mao Tse-tung personally, is a Party armed with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's Thought, [...].¹⁸³

From this it can be said that the CCP wanted to imply the image of China as a leader in the world revolution.

Thus the Chinese press and magazines tried to spread the idea that Mao Zedong Thought and Mao were greatly respected by the people of the world. The image of China coincided with that of Mao; China was implicitly suggested to be the respected world leader in the anti-imperialist struggle. And the Red Guards were in a way influenced by the CCP rhetoric to regard themselves as favourable torchbearers of the world revolution.

2.3. Chinese denunciations of JCP "revisionists" and praise for Japanese Maoists

The influence of the split between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1964 on other communist and socialist organisations in the world was enormous. The Japanese Communist Party was one communist party which was deeply affected by the rupture between the two big socialist powers. The dispute between the CCP and the JCP over Soviet participation in the international united front, especially during the

¹⁸³'Long live Mao Tse-tung's Thought--In commemoration of the 45th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China' in *PR* No.27, 1 July 1966, p.5.

Vietnam Wars, caused serious hostility between the two parties in early 1966.¹⁸⁴ The Maoists of the CCP insisted that the CPSU should not be included in a united front against the United States, because, the Maoists claimed, the CPSU was also an enemy of the people of the world. Meanwhile, the JCP said that the CPSU should be regarded as an anti-imperialist power. After the split at a meeting in the spring of 1966, relations between the CCP and the JCP deteriorated rapidly.¹⁸⁵

In this section, I will look at both Chinese denunciations of the "revisionists" in the Japanese Communist Party and Chinese praise for the Japanese Maoists in Chinese publications mainly of 1967. I will attempt to show that the Chinese denounced the JCP "revisionists" as being anti-Maoist, and praised them for being Maoist. This section will also partly show examples of the Chinese Maoist rhetorical strategy that was directed towards other "fraternal" parties and peoples.

At first I will look at denunciations by the Chinese Maoists of the Japanese "revisionists." In 1967, there were two big "violent incidents" which showed the seriousness of the dispute between the CCP and the JCP. There was a clash between Maoist Chinese students and members from the Japanese Communist Party at Zenrin Hall in Tokyo in March 1967. *Renmin Ribao* thoroughly denounced "revisionists" in the JCP as being allied to the United States, the USSR and the Japanese government over the anti-Chinese campaign:

It was by no means accidental that the revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party should have staged such a dirty performance at a time when U.S. imperialism, the revisionist leading clique of the C.P.S.U. and the reactionaries of all countries are frenziedly assailing China's great proletarian cultural revolution and whipping up a violent anti-Chinese campaign, and particularly immediately following repeated anti-Chinese atrocities committed by the Soviet revisionist leading clique [...]. The anti-Chinese incidents engineered by the revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party wholly served the interests of the

¹⁸⁴Nakajima, Mineo, *Nihon kyosanto to Chugoku kyosanto [The Japanese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party]* (Nitchu Shuppan, Tokyo, 1981), pp.16-17.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p.17.

Soviet revisionist leading clique and the reactionaries of the United States and Japan [...]. People can now clearly see that the "united action" so vociferously advocated by the revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party is after all nothing other than open collusion with the U.S. imperialists, Japanese reactionaries and the Soviet revisionist leading clique. In this collusion the Japanese revisionists serve as their anti-Chinese villains!¹⁸⁶

The article tried to criticise the Japanese "revisionists" from the aspect of the international anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggle. According to the article, the clash was not merely a matter between China and Japan. In emphasising the "alliance" among the "imperialist" United States, the "revisionist" Soviet Union, the "reactionary" Japanese government and the "revisionists" in the JCP, the CCP wanted to indicate that the "revisionists" in the JCP were not only the enemies of China alone but also the common enemies of the peoples of the world. By calling the Japanese "revisionists" "anti-Chinese ...," the article listed the "revisionists" in the same group as US imperialists and Soviet "revisionists" who had been repeatedly claimed to be anti-Chinese.¹⁸⁷ In the CCP rhetoric, anti-China was supposed to mean anti-peoples, because, as the CCP had often described, Mao-led China was on the people's side in the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle.

In early August 1967, there was a violent action at Beijing Airport by Chinese and Japanese ultra-leftists against two JCP members who were going to leave China for Japan via North Korea. One of the members was from the JCP Central Committee and had been in Beijing for two years, and the other had been an *Akahata*¹⁸⁸ correspondent in Beijing. In response to a protest by the JCP, saying that the incident was supported by some "organisation related to the CCP,"¹⁸⁹ a *Renmin Ribao* editorial, entitled "Kenji Miyamoto Group's betrayal" on 6 August 1967, criticised the JCP "revisionists." The article also

¹⁸⁶'Strong protest against anti-Chinese atrocities committed by revisionists in Japanese C.P.' in *RMRB*, 11 March 1967, translated in *PR* No.12, 17 March 1967, pp.24-25.

¹⁸⁷For example, 'Anti-China rumour combine' in *PR* No.7, 10 February 1967, pp.30-31. and 'The Soviet revisionist renegades cannot stop the forward march of the Afro-Asian people's solidarity movement against imperialism' in *PR* No.9, 24 February 1967, pp.24-29.

¹⁸⁸The official organ of the JCP ("Akahata" means "red flag.")

¹⁸⁹'Sunama, Konno ryo doshi ni taisuru pekin kuko de no shudan boko ni tsuite [About the mass violence in Beijing Airport against Comrades Sunama and Konno]' in *Akahata*, 6 August 1967, p.1.

emphasised that the group had shown its alliance with the US, the USSR and the Japanese government:

The Kenji Miyamoto revisionist clique of the Communist Party of Japan [...(made a false statement about the matter)...]. This is another anti-China incident this clique has deliberately manufactured in close co-ordination with the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists and the reactionary Eisaku Sato government [...]. Sure enough, the group has now actually recalled Sunama and Konno and thus laid down one of its cards against China, thereby once again joining all the other doughty warriors in anti-China activities in an attempt to solicit rewards from the U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists and Japanese reactionaries [...]. The Miyamoto group's frantic opposition to China is entirely against the will and wishes of the masses of the Japanese people. By serving as willing anti-China pawns of U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Sato government and grossly betraying the Japanese people's revolutionary cause, the group has joined the ranks of the new scabs of our time.¹⁹⁰

The articles revealed the CCP's rhetorical strategy which determined that whoever opposed Mao, that is, whoever did not oppose the "revisionist" Soviet Union, would be regarded as being in alliance with the enemy of the world people, the United States.

Red Guards criticised the "revisionists" in the JCP even more harshly. The rhetoric of their attacks was quite emotional and it clearly showed the Red Guards' devotion to Mao. The denunciation extended to calling the Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party, Miyamoto Kenji, "utterly stupid":

This bastard Miyamoto Kenji had repeatedly attacked our country's Red Guards, distorted the situation of the Japan-China Parties Conference, announced the anti-China statement, and openly put down the reddest sun in the Red Guards' hearts, Chairman Mao. [...]. Miyamoto Kenji and your ilk, you stupid bastards, listen carefully with your damn ears, whoever opposes Chairman Mao should be

¹⁹⁰'Kenji Miyamoto Group's betrayal' in *RMRB*, 6 August 1967, translated in *PR* No.33, 11 August 1967, pp.17-18.

overthrown! We will hit you on your damn heads with our iron fists stretching to Tokyo! [...] (if you are) anti-imperialist, (you) must be anti-revisionist. Therefore we have to oppose the Soviet revisionism! We have to overthrow Brezhnev! We have to hit Kosygin on his damn head! Are you feeling bad!? Once we hit the Soviet revisionists, your hearts will be in pain! (You are linked to each other.) [...] Miyamoto Kenji, (you are so) shameless, miserable and cheeky!¹⁹¹

How threatening to them (the "Miyamoto clique") the violent revolution and armed struggle are! They (the "Miyamoto clique") are shouting stuff like "following blindly" and "dogmatism." In short: they are against the Japanese people's learning Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, thus they bring the revolution of the Japanese people into the orbit of revisionism. They have already degenerated into "extremely stupid bastards" who are only thinking of "getting the majority of the votes under the dictatorship of the capitalist," and "traitors" and "pedants" who "cheat workers"!¹⁹²

Next, I will look at Chinese praise for the Japanese Maoists and people in Chinese publications. The following article in *Peking Review* gave high praise to the Japanese Maoists, who had withdrawn from the "revisionist" JCP and established their own "prefectural committees of the JCP." The main reason the article spoke very highly of the Japanese Maoists was that they supported and devotedly followed Mao Zedong Thought in their "struggle against the reactionaries and revisionists." Even though the article seems to be praising the Japanese Maoists at first glance, in actuality it merely showed Chinese support for Mao Zedong Thought:

Holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Japanese revolutionary Left are rebelling in a big way against the U.S. and Japanese

¹⁹¹'Gongben Xianzhi hundan touding [Miyamoto Kenji, utterly stupid]' in *Hongqi*, 2 October 1967, p.3, in *RGP* Vol.6, p.1537.

¹⁹²'Chuoquan Gongben Xianzhi de huapi [Pierce Miyamoto Kenji's disguise]' in *Hongqi*, 8 March 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.6, p.1548.

reactionaries and the Soviet and Japanese revisionists. [...]. A striking feature of the Japanese revolutionary Left and progressive organizations is their boundless love for Chairman Mao and their absolute faith in Mao Tse-tung's thought. They take Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guide to their action and study and apply Chairman Mao's works creatively in the course of struggles. [...]. China's great proletarian cultural revolution has greatly inspired the rebellious spirit of Japan's revolutionary Left. [...]. Despite the joint efforts of the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries, the Soviet revisionists and the Miyamoto group to suppress the Japanese revolution today, and despite the many difficulties and problems still confronting the Japanese revolutionary Left, the radiance of Mao Tse-tung's thought is illuminating the forward path of revolution in Japan [...].¹⁹³

In March 1967, a group of ten Japanese leftists, including the wife of the former General Secretary of the JCP, visited the Red Guards of Beijing Aeronautical Engineering Institute for an exchange. In praise of the Japanese Maoists, a Red Guard article pointed out their devotion to the Cultural Revolution and Mao, but did not, for instance, explain how the Japanese Maoists had been fighting against the Japanese "revisionists":

[They] have come! The wife of Tokuda Kyuichi, at the advanced age of 70, [...] with her face glowing with health, waving the very red *Words of Chairman Mao*, slowly walked up on the platform. "Arise, prisoners of starvation! Arise, the suffering people of the whole world! Our righteous indignation is burning [...]." [...] Yokogawa Jiro with a mane of grey hair gave a brilliant talk. He praised highly great Mao Zedong Thought, spoke highly of China's Cultural Revolution and Red Guards, and gave each red-banner fighter an exceedingly lively vivid political class. [...]. A red-banner fighter representative well said, "Although our languages and nationalities are different from each other, our hearts are beating for the same purpose, which is --- to realise communism in the whole world!" [...] the red-banner fighters gave the Japanese friends shining souvenir badges of Chairman Mao and red-banner armbands which have gone

¹⁹³'Japanese revolutionary Left grows rapidly in struggle' in *PR* No.36, 1 September 1967, pp.24-26.

through battle. China's young Red Guard generals and Japan's old anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist heroes, hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder, hearts linked together, firmly believe, "Today, we met in Beijing, but sometime in future we are sure to meet in the Japanese people's Tokyo."¹⁹⁴

The following paragraph clearly illustrates how much the Red Guards valued the application of Mao Zedong Thought to the Japanese revolution:

In their struggle, the Japanese people have experienced deeply the great meaning of Mao Zedong Thought. They have organised a number of small groups and classes for studying Chairman Mao's writings. They love reading books written by Chairman Mao best, and deeply love Chairman Mao.¹⁹⁵

In a round-table talk between six Red Guards and five young Japanese Maoists in Beijing on 7 February 1967, some of the Red Guards gave messages to the Japanese people, and expressed their wish to "support" the Japanese people's struggle:

We are very much interested in the Japanese people's revolutionary struggle. We will stand by the Japanese people's side forever, and support the Japanese people's anti-US patriotic struggle and anti-revisionist struggle. (Shi Wenjie, aged 21, Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Engineering)¹⁹⁶

In the midst of great violent change, great diversification and great reorganisation of the whole world, we have to fight persistently against imperialism, revisionism and every country's reactionaries and win a new victory for the world revolution by uniting ourselves with the people of Japan and the peoples of the world. (Liang Xingbao, aged 26, Beijing Institute of Mining Industry)¹⁹⁷

The Red Guards tried to portray the image that they were keen not only to pursue the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but also to give support for revolutions abroad, including

¹⁹⁴'Tong Riben fanxiu zhanshi huanju yitang [With Japanese anti-revisionist fighters, happily gather under the same roof]' in *Hongqi*, 21 March 1967, p.4, in *RGP* Vol.6, p.1557.

¹⁹⁵'Chuoquan Gongben Xianzhi de huapi [Pierce Miyamoto Kenji's disguise]' in *Hongqi*, 8 March 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.6, p.1548.

¹⁹⁶'Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview Red Guards]' in *JC* No.5, 1967, p.83.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*

revolution in Japan. The Chinese revolutionaries' image, which is revealed in the messages above, is that they are "friends" of the Japanese people and the peoples of the world. In the interview, there was no image of the Red Guards trying to "lead" revolutions abroad, except by exporting Mao Zedong Thought.

Lastly, I will look briefly at Chinese Maoists' actual intervention in anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggles in Japan, in order to show an example of contradiction between Chinese rhetoric and action in Maoist revolutionary policy on foreign countries (but, as we have seen, there was also contradiction within rhetorical strategies).

An article written by Miyoshi Hajime, a Japanese Maoist who met Mao Zedong in Beijing in early 1966, showed the Maoist way of struggling against the common enemies by forming a firm unity among the people. Mao talked to some Japanese Maoists who visited him from Japan:

All of you (both those who have actively fought through the passport struggle and those who have not) have to unite. Who tried to bother you about your visit to China? You know (who they are) very well, don't you? To struggle against those who interfere with you, you must unite.¹⁹⁸

Thus Mao tried to be rid of a minor conflict among the Japanese Maoists, without criticising those who did not try hard to get their passports for this trip to China. To unite peoples against the common enemies (both imperialists and revisionists) was the Maoist way of pursuing a revolution. Mao directly indicated how to struggle with common enemies, while an international united front came to be less emphasised once the Cultural Revolution began soon after this. The extract above can be seen as an example of direct instructions of Maoist revolutionary policy which were given to foreign "revolutionaries." Strictly speaking, this contradicted the CCP's claimed revolutionary strategy which held that; revolution in each country should rely on its own people. But the quote perhaps also shows that Mao would give *moral* support for revolutions abroad.

¹⁹⁸'Mo shuseki ni aeta yorokobi [Joy of having finally met Chairman Mao]' in *JC* No.2, 1966, p.27. The Japanese government was reluctant to issue the Japanese Maoists' passports. The writer of the article said that Mao knew that there had been some unpleasant feeling between those who had tried hard to get their passports and those who did not try hard enough.

Both CCP Maoists and Red Guards were in actuality verbally interfering other countries' revolutions. The Red Guards portrayed their stance as respecting and supporting the Japanese and other countries' revolutions, even though the extreme rhetorical denunciations of the Japanese "revisionists" were done by the Red Guards. The Chinese criterion for distinguishing between enemies and allies abroad was whether or not they followed Mao Zedong Thought, which regarded both the United States and the Soviet Union as the enemies of the world revolution. The Chinese Maoists thus distinguished between Japanese enemies and Japanese allies by the same standards that they did Chinese enemies and Chinese allies. The Chinese Maoists, those in the CCP and the Red Guards, seemed to be wishing to lead the Japanese revolutionaries through applying Mao Zedong Thought to the revolution in Japan, even though this leadership was rhetorical.

Chapter Three:

China's self-image

3.1. The world revolution in the Chinese context

From the mid 1960s to the late 1960s, the Chinese press showed its unique points of view on China's role in the international anti-imperialist struggle. Firstly, it presented China itself as the biggest obstacle to U.S. imperialism. Secondly, it implied that China had become the centre in the international anti-imperialist forces, after the split with the Soviet Union. Thirdly, it declared that Mao Zedong Thought, which, it claimed, had developed Marxism-Leninism,¹⁹⁹ was the only principle that all the revolutionaries of the world should follow in their anti-imperialist struggles. These points of view appear to indicate that Chinese communist leaders and theorists strove for a high status on the international stage by using a rhetoric that distinguished China from the capitalist and Soviet worlds. Even though it is quite usual for a country to try to achieve a more important international role, the Chinese case was significant in terms of the contradiction in its rhetoric. For China, the world revolution not only meant defeating imperialism, but also meant improving Chinese status in the world. Through observing Chinese propaganda, this section will examine the CCP's nationalistic intentions in promoting the international anti-imperialist struggle.

Socialist China had long insisted that US imperialism was the biggest enemy of the people of the world.²⁰⁰ Therefore the Chinese repeatedly advocated that the international anti-imperialist struggle should be pursued by a worldwide united front. This was the CCP's line before the Cultural Revolution began in mid 1966. Even though China was supposed to

¹⁹⁹For example, 'Long live Mao Tse-tung's Thought' in *PR* No.27, 1 July 1966, p.5.

²⁰⁰For example, 'Direct spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperialism' in *PR* No.17, 23 April 1965, p.12.

be just one of the many anti-imperialist powers of the world, the Chinese tended to refer to themselves as the most powerful enemy of the United States:

We should at no time forget that U.S. imperialism regards New China as the biggest obstacle to its policy of aggression and war.²⁰¹

China is a great revolutionary country. The Chinese people are persevering in their socialist revolution and socialist construction at home, and they firmly support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed people and oppressed nations abroad. Precisely for this reason, U.S. imperialism regards China as the principal obstacle in the way of its policies of war and aggression in Asia and of the realization of its "global strategy."²⁰²

Wherever there is struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, the Chinese people never fail to lend their support. This stand of the Chinese people will not be altered, whatever the circumstances. **This is in fact the true reason why U.S. imperialism hates China so bitterly.**²⁰³

The Chinese leaders apparently accepted the possibility of a direct war between China and the United States after the escalation of the US bombing of North Vietnam in 1965:

We must be prepared for a war they (U.S. imperialists) may start at some later date, and be even more prepared for an early war; we must be prepared for a small-scale war and even more for a large-scale war.²⁰⁴

It seems as if the Chinese leaders wanted to imply "revolutionary" China's greatness, through referring to its being the main target of US imperialism. A particular tense situation by the heavy involvement of the US into the Vietnam War might have also affected this CCP rhetoric.

²⁰¹'Hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and courageously drive ahead' in *PR* No.40, 1 October 1965, p.10.

²⁰²'The war threat of U.S. imperialism must be taken seriously' in *PR* No.15, 8 April 1966, p.7.

²⁰³'Refuting Bundy' in *PR* No.9, 25 February 1966, p.10.

²⁰⁴'The war threat of U.S. imperialism must be taken seriously' in *PR* No.15, 8 April 1966, p.7.

However, in actuality, China avoided becoming involved in a war with the United States. Gordon H. Chang observed:

Behind the bombastic language Lin (Biao) was actually maintaining (in his article, "Long live the victory of people's war!")²⁰⁵ that the Vietnamese and other revolutionaries could rely on their own efforts and resources to attain victory, as the Chinese Communists had done. They should not expect supportive intervention from outside. In other words China would not directly involve itself in Vietnam.²⁰⁶

The CCP became independent from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in terms of anti-imperialist policy, and tried to be the leader of the socialist camp and the "Third World" after the split of the two parties in the mid 1960s. The more the CCP proclaimed its radical policy against the United States, the deeper the gap between the two parties became. The USSR, which was harshly denounced by the CCP for pursuing a revisionist way through "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, allowed the CCP to try to promote themselves in the socialist camp and the "Third World." Against the "betrayal" of the CPSU, the CCP declared that it would not hesitate to give support for anti-US struggles in any country:

Our people shoulder the proletarian internationalist obligation of supporting the people of all countries in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.²⁰⁷

It seems that, in order to impress the rest of the world even more, the Chinese press emphasised that China would also devote itself to anti-US struggles abroad. Just before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, Peng Zhen, then member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and Mayor of Beijing, declared:

The Chinese people will spare no sacrifice in resolutely performing their proletarian internationalist duty.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵The article was published in September 1965.

²⁰⁶Chang, p.270.

²⁰⁷'Hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and courageously drive ahead' in *PR* No.40, 1 October 1965, p.10.

In addition, *Renmin Ribao* editorial wrote:

In supporting the just struggle of other peoples, China is only fulfilling its internationalist obligation and will never ask for any reward from others.²⁰⁹

It can be said that the Chinese media implied that China had become the new leader of the international anti-imperialist struggle, by contrasting China's "strong faith in the world revolution" with the "betrayal" by the former leader, the Soviet Union. The USSR was always in the Chinese leaders' minds when it came to the world revolution through the anti-US struggle. In order to gain higher status in the world, the CPSU, not US imperialism, was supposed to be the biggest target for the CCP to "defeat."

A Red Guard article regarded the Chinese revolution as having the same importance as the October Revolution in Russia of 1917, and the Cultural Revolution intensified this rhetoric:

The victory in the "October Revolution" and the Chinese revolution ushered in a new century of a regime which allowed the proletariat and other working peoples to seize power with violence. **"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."** For power struggles of the unliberated and oppressed peoples and oppressed nations, this has set up a shining example and has shown a direction to advance forward.²¹⁰

The article implied that China had inherited the spirit of the October Revolution, which was the first victory of socialism by armed force. The Maoists thus tried to justify their insistence that it was the Chinese way that the revolutionary people all over the world should follow.

Application of Mao Zedong Thought to the world revolution was another thing that China attempted, in terms of promotion of the national status. Lin Biao, the then Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP, Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defence, wrote in his article, "Long live the victory of people's war!":

²⁰⁸'Direct spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperialism' in *PR* No.17, 23 April 1965, p.13. Peng Zhen later became a victim of the Cultural Revolution.

²⁰⁹'A major victory for China's foreign policy of peace' in *PR* No.18, 29 April 1966, p.11.

²¹⁰'Guanjian zai yu duoquan [The key is in seizing power]' in *Dongfanghong*, 22 January 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4046.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution, but has also the characteristics of our epoch. The new experience gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries since World War II has provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world.²¹¹

He implied in the article that Mao Zedong Thought was the best strategy for the world revolutionaries to pursue. The following story showed both Mao's "superiority" to the CPSU in leading the world revolution and the "greatness" of Mao Zedong Thought:

On their way to China, Norwegian friends of a trade union delegation were asked at Moscow airport whether they had any weapons with them. They replied, "Yes, we have," and each took out of his pocket a copy of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*. This gave the Soviet revisionists quite a shock. During their stay in China, these Norwegian friends always carried their *Quotations* with them. They described this book as the weapon of all revolutionaries and the guarantee for victory in the world revolution. The people of the world would certainly win their liberation provided they master the thought of Mao Tse-tung, they said.²¹²

To the Maoists, China was not merely one of many revolutionary powers in the world any more. China was supposed to be the leader of the world revolution. The Maoists assumed that the USSR, which used to provide a good model for the construction of socialism, had changed to become one of the enemies that the people of the world had to attack. The image of China which is revealed in the articles above is that, with the leadership of Mao Zedong, China became the most resolute anti-imperialist power in the world. According to the articles, other countries should also apply the revolutionary strategy based on Mao Zedong Thought, because the history of people's wars all over the world had proved Mao Zedong Thought to be the only "guarantee for victory in the world revolution."²¹³

²¹¹'Long live the victory of people's war!' in *PR* No.36, 3 September 1965, p.9.

²¹²'Chairman Mao, revolutionary people of the world will always follow you!' in *PR* No.1, 3 January 1968, p.39.

²¹³*Ibid.*

3.2. Peaceful and militant images

China in the 1960s tried to impress the rest of the world with its contrasting peace-loving and revolutionary images. The split with the USSR gave the CCP an opportunity to improve China's status in the socialist camp. But it also created anxiety over national security. China continued the struggle against US imperialism, but chose to do so without the support of the USSR, and within certain limits. The CCP was careful not to provoke the United States into hostility against China. China's anti-imperialist policy in the 1960s remained relatively moderate in practice, with the exception of the summer of 1967. Yet Chinese propaganda in publications showed both peaceful and militant images of China. This propaganda pushed nationalistic rather than revolutionary ideas.

Chinese leaders tried to skillfully balance the country's peaceful and militant images tactically. I will look briefly at the Sino-Indian boundary dispute as an example of CCP rhetorical strategies in the early 1960s.

But before examining CCP rhetorical strategies over the boundary question, I should refer briefly to trends in Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. Beijing's hostility against New Delhi greatly increased in 1959 when Nehru received the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader who had fled from Chinese-occupied Tibet, with respect.²¹⁴ Shortly after the Dalai Lama's escape, a military clash between China and India occurred. China was unhappy when the Soviet Union only expressed "regret" at the clash, because that meant that the USSR, a powerful socialist country, neither supported socialist China nor denounced "bourgeois" India.²¹⁵ The CCP came to feel a sense of crisis that New Delhi and Moscow were becoming closer to each other. Finally, ideological arguments between Beijing and Moscow began in 1960. However, at this stage, the Sino-Soviet disputes were not thought to be serious, and were not generally known.

²¹⁴Uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.229.

²¹⁵Ibid., pp.229-230.

As V. P. Dutt has suggested, China wanted the boundary question between the two countries dealt with within the context of inter-Asian solidarity.²¹⁶ From a Chinese point of view, that way would be more effective in drawing other Asian countries' attention to anti-US united front policy than dealing with the problem as just a matter for the two countries. It seems that in that way China tried to impress upon the rest of Asia an "aggressive" image of US imperialism which was pulling the strings in India,²¹⁷ as well as to reduce Beijing's hostility with New Delhi.

The Indian government became closer to both the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.²¹⁸ A *Peking Review* article claimed that the amount of US aid to India became much bigger after India started its supposed anti-China campaign in 1959.²¹⁹ In addition, a *Renmin Ribao* editorial showed statistical "evidence" of US aid (from 1949 to July 1962) to India, in order to indicate that the annual average amount of aid was much higher after the "Nehru government had stirred up the anti-China campaign" than before (the article claimed that the Nehru government had begun turning to the US side in 1956).²²⁰

Beijing was not happy with New Delhi gradually becoming closer to the US and USSR, but China showed "tolerance" on the boundary dispute at first:

China and India, as two big powers in Asia as well as two world powers, need all the more to live amicably with each other and make valuable contributions to the cause of Asian-African solidarity and world peace. Proceeding precisely from the vital interest of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the interest of world peace, the Chinese Government has always held that the present boundary dispute between China and India is only a question of a temporary and partial nature, and should be settled fairly and reasonably in accordance with the Five

²¹⁶Dutt, V.P., *China's foreign policy* (Hindustan Scientific Press, Delhi, 1964), p.208.

²¹⁷For example, Loomba, Joanne F., 'U.S. aid to India 1951-1967--A study in decision-making' in Grover, Verinder (ed.), *International relations and foreign policy of India No.6--USA and India's foreign policy* (Deep&Deep Publications, New Dahli, 1992), p.506.

²¹⁸Barnouin and Yu, p.73.

²¹⁹'U.S. "aid" and India's anti-Chinese campaign' in *PP* No.43, 26 October 1962, p.15.

²²⁰'More on Nehru's philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian boundary question' in *RMRB*, 27 October 1962, translated in *PR* No.45, 2 November 1962, p.17.

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and through friendly consultations.²²¹

The statement above shows a Chinese portrayal of China as a major power in Asia and the world, and a peace-loving nation. The statement also reveals an intention to deal with India as a powerful country like China. The CCP was afraid of strong links developing between India and the Soviet Union. China therefore did not want to provoke India into becoming seriously hostile to China.

When heavy military clashes between China and India in the border areas were reported in 1962 and 1965, China claimed that India was the first to attack.²²² (India said the opposite.) And the CCP showed its militancy in a veiled way:

It (the Indian government) must immediately stop its intrusions and provocations against China, or else the Chinese side will give it such punishment as it deserves.²²³

In this extract, China's stance was portrayed as defensive and assumed a moral right to "punish." The defensive language indicated that China did not want to be seen as a threat, especially in Asia, after China had used armed force in reality. To allay "Third World" countries' fear of China, the CCP presented an image that the Chinese people loved peace, and that military action was always a last resort for China. China spoke as if China's efforts to maintain the policy of "peaceful coexistence" among Asian and African countries were being attacked by the Indian government's pro-imperialist and pro-revisionist policies. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial said:

All who are concerned with Afro-Asian solidarity and Asian peace, hope that the Indian Government will not, on the strength of U.S. imperialist aid, cling to a blind faith in the use of force to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question. [...]. For the sake of Afro-Asian solidarity and the common interests of Afro-Asian countries in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, leaders of many

²²¹Statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' in *PR* No.50, 15 December 1961, p.18.

²²²For example, 'It's Nehru who refuses to negotiate and who orders fighting' in *PR* No.43, 26 October 1962, p.9.

²²³'Strong protest against Indian troops' armed provocation' in *PR* No.51, 17 December 1965, p.13.

Afro-Asian countries have exerted their influence and made positive efforts to promote the reopening of negotiations between China and India.²²⁴

Both peaceful and militant images were used by the CCP to gain as many revolutionary allies as possible. China, on the one hand, had to be revolutionary and militant enough to attract the "oppressed peoples" of the world. In addition, in order to distinguish its "orthodox" Marxism-Leninism from Soviet "revisionism", the CCP kept insisting on the need for violence in anti-imperialist struggles. But on the other hand, the Chinese press also often emphasised their peace-loving image, because they wanted to indicate that it was world peace that China ultimately strove for.

The usage of the two contrasting images was influenced by the Chinese government's ideas about their place in the world. For example, after a successful nuclear test in October 1964, the CCP repeatedly emphasised that China developed the nuclear weapon in the hope of world peace, because the CCP thought that China might look like a threat to the rest of the world, especially to "Third World" governments and revolutionary organisations:

The people of the socialist countries and other peace-loving people all over the world, especially the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, are convinced that nuclear weapons in the hands of socialist China are a mighty force in defence of world peace.²²⁵

It (China's success in a nuclear test) is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people and to all the revolutionary peoples of the world, as well as an important contribution to the defence of world peace.²²⁶

Although the CCP had kept saying that the nuclear weapons of the imperialist was threatening world peace, it claimed that "nuclear weapons in the hands of socialist China"

²²⁴'An unshakable principle' in *RMRB*, 10 December 1962, translated in *PR* No.50, 14 December 1962, pp.6-7.

²²⁵'Break the nuclear monopoly, eliminate nuclear weapons' in *PR* No.44, 30 October 1964, p.5.

²²⁶'China successfully conducts new nuclear explosion' from *Xinhua*, 28 December 1966, in *PR* No.1, 1 January 1967, p.7.

would contribute to world peace.²²⁷ The Chinese media repeatedly explained that China's nuclear development was inevitable in order to gain world peace through worldwide anti-US struggle, and that China would never be the first country to use nuclear weapons.

On occasions of announcement of nuclear tests, Chinese official publications printed acclaim from all over the world. However, as most of the acclaim was from less powerful governments, communist and socialist parties, other revolutionary organisations and individuals, it seemed clear that the CCP's worldwide united front policy against the United States was not working to the extent that they wished. As a result of this, there was an attempt to show how many friends China had, even printing acclaim from non-official foreign individuals, such as a "famous" Chilean artist.²²⁸

The militant image was also important for the Chinese to gain allies. It was connected with the CCP's separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was supposedly revisionist. China claimed itself as a devoted follower of Marxism-Leninism. And, as Steven M. Goldstein has asserted, the Chinese leaders wanted to avoid Soviet control over China in 1960s.²²⁹ The CCP tried to gain firm solidarity with the non-Soviet socialist camp, even though this was very hard to achieve. China's failure in holding the Second Afro-Asian Conference in 1965, when the majority of participants insisted upon Soviet participation, was one example that revealed the difficulty. China's hostility towards the USSR coincided partly with the strong Soviet influence on the socialist camp.

The Vietnam War, although an actual threat to China's national security, provided the CCP with a good opportunity to get allies through publishing articles and statements showing China's militant attitudes against imperialism. Because of the Soviet stance towards the Vietnam War, China regarded the Soviet Union as a follower of US imperialism, and tried to get other countries involved in not only anti-US, but anti-USSR struggles, while

²²⁷For example, 'Dapo helongduan, xiaomie hewuqi [Break the nuclear monopoly, eliminate the nuclear weapons]' in *RMRB*, 22 October 1964, p.1.

²²⁸'Zhuhe Zhongguo he shiyan chenggong [Celebrate success of China's nuclear test]' in *RMRB*, 22 October 1964, p.5.

²²⁹Goldstein, Steven M., 'Nationalism and internationalism: Sino-Soviet relations' in Robinson, Thomas W. and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese foreign policy--theory and practice* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), p.225.

Moscow was giving support to North Vietnam (The Soviet Union was being said by China to be seeking for a peaceful settlement of the War).

The "militant Chinese armed with Mao Zedong Thought" were portrayed as the most reliable revolutionaries, who would undoubtedly defeat imperialism (This was stronger with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution). *Renmin Ribao* printed pro-Chinese comments from some Asian and African novelists in September 1966. A Syrian representative said that each Chinese had both a weapon, and a book written by Mao Zedong, in his/her hands, and that no one could defeat them.²³⁰ A "representative from Congo" told a Chinese journalist that China was the hope of the world proletariat, not only because the Chinese were well prepared for defeating imperialism thoroughly within the country, but also because the Chinese were keen to help other countries with proletarian revolutions.²³¹

China regarded itself as a rapidly growing power in the world, and its media presented its influence on the rest of the world, especially on "Third World" countries, to be enormous in terms of the world revolution. But national egoism was considered unacceptable by Chinese leaders. In Chinese media, statements about China's greatness supposedly written/described by foreign "revolutionaries" in foreign-language media were published instead. That was one of the main reasons the CCP was careful about image of China abroad. The CCP put great effort into building an international united front against imperialism, using both peaceful and militant imagery.

However, after the mid 1960s, China began losing relatively powerful allies one after another. The Indonesian Communist Party collapsed in a coup d'état in September 1965, and the JCP, which did not agree with the CCP on dealing with the CPSU line on an international united front, broke with the CCP in March 1966. The CCP also lost support from the North Korean Labour Party in the same year. Apart from that, as we have seen the previous chapter, China's radical revolutionary policies reduced support from many other communist and socialist parties. Understanding the unfavorable situation, China came to

²³⁰'Zhongguo shi quan shijie wuchan jieji de xiwang [China is a hope of proletariats of the whole world]' in *RMRB*, 14 September 1966, p.4.

²³¹*Ibid.*

concentrate on supporting anti-imperialist armed struggles of smaller size in some foreign countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand.²³²

Both peaceful and militant images were thus used in the Chinese official media for the purpose of impressing the rest of the world with China's developing role on the international stage. Moreover, the CCP thought that anti-imperialist struggle by the rest of the world would assist China's national security. In the latter part of the 1960s, the Chinese media, mainly *Peking Review*, came to enthusiastically promote Mao Zedong Thought abroad, as the CCP felt itself becoming steadily isolated, even in the socialist camp. And this was associated with the stronger critique of revisionism--following the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, which made criticism of non-Maoist policies more intense.

3.3. Centre of the world revolution

In the late 1960s, China wanted to portray itself as being at the centre of world revolution. Although the Chinese leaders tended to avoid saying this themselves, there were many statements, by foreigners and Red Guards, which praised China as the leader of the international anti-imperialist struggle. Chinese official propaganda avoided showing the Chinese people or leaders making such claim, but was happy to print them as coming from the mouths of foreigners. The number of such statements rapidly increased in Chinese publications in 1967 and 1968, when the Cultural Revolution reached a peak in terms of the "revolutionary" activities of the Red Guards. Foreign statements giving high praise to China may have stimulated Chinese revolutionaries to feel even more confident and proud of their "leadership" in world revolution. Many articles written by Red Guards praised China for being the leader of world revolution. As we will see later in this section, some articles praised the Red Guards as the most serious revolutionaries in the world.

China terminated diplomatic relations with many governments and lost friendly relations with other communist and socialist parties once the Cultural Revolution began.

²³²Uno, Kobayashi and Yabuki (eds.), p.337.

Even though China made every effort to get as many allies as possible in the first part of the 1960s, the Maoist extreme "revolutionary" policy after 1966 resulted in the loss of even long-time friendships, such as those with the North Korean Labour Party and the JCP. The Cultural Revolution caused a break with the early 1960s by strengthening anti-revisionist rhetoric which affected foreign relations. Despite what was being said in Chinese publications, China was isolated.

In this section, I will examine certain statements, mainly by foreigners and Red Guards, to further explicate the Maoist strategy of promoting the Chinese Cultural Revolution, rather than the world revolution, to Chinese revolutionaries. But the expected effect of these articles was supposed to be more than to encourage the enthusiasm of the Chinese people for "world revolution"; it seemed that to impress the rest of the world with the "greatness" of China was another important aim of the articles.

There were quite a number of foreign statements declaring that China was contributing greatly to the world revolution:

Today, China is the centre of the world revolution, Peking is the beacon of the world revolution [...]. (By a Burmese friend)²³³

Socialist China has become the bulwark of the proletarian world revolution. (By a Japanese friend, Junichiro Ide)²³⁴

We, all of us, every revolutionary in the world, should everywhere defend with blood and fire People's China, the vanguard of the proletarian revolution of the world, the base of the world revolution, [...]. (Letter by Saturnino Paredes Macedo, General Secretary of Peruvian Communist Party)²³⁵

²³³'The world's people love Chairman Mao' in *PR* No.9, 24 February 1967, p.16.

²³⁴'China's Great Cultural Revolution has opened a new era in world history' in *PR* No.21, 19 March 1967, p.25.

²³⁵'China's Great Cultural Revolution is a big leap forward in the world revolution' in *PR* No.45, 3 November 1967, p.20.

A Cameroon fighter, Bally, [...] said: "The great victory of the cultural revolution has turned China into a great, impregnable base for world revolution."

(By a Congolese (B)²³⁶ student, Bayonne)²³⁷

Today Peking has become the centre of the world proletarian revolution [...].

China's great proletarian cultural revolution not only concerns the future of China but also that of the world proletariat. (By Masayoshi Fukuda, a leading member of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee (Left)²³⁸ of the Communist Party of Japan)²³⁹

China has become the great bulwark of socialism and communism in the world, the mighty base of the world revolution, the standard-bearer of Marxism-Leninism and the firm, faithful and steadfast defender of the people of all countries who are striving for freedom and national independence. (A message by Albanian Party and state leaders²⁴⁰)²⁴¹

Great China of Mao Tse-tung has shown by facts that she is the defender of the peoples, big and small, of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and of Europe in their struggle against the intrigues and plots of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. (By Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian Party of Labour)²⁴²

People's China now enjoys indisputable world popularity and prestige. The people of the world look with admiration and respect towards this great Asian socialist country which is the powerful bastion of the struggle against U.S.

²³⁶Brazzaville

²³⁷'World's revolutionary people acclaim the May 16, 1966 Circular' in *PR* No.22, 31 May 1968, p.25.

²³⁸Maoist

²³⁹'May 16, 1966 Circular inspires world's people in revolutionary struggle' in *PR* No.23, 7 June 1968, pp.18-19.

²⁴⁰Enver Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi and Mehmet Shehu

²⁴¹'Albanian party and government delegation visits China' in *PR* No.40, 4 October 1968, p.25.

²⁴²'Comrade Enver Hoxha's important speech' in *PR* No.41, 11 October 1968, p.17.

imperialism and the main base area of the revolutionary movement. (By Organ of the Communist Party of Brazil, *Classe Operaria*)²⁴³

These statements were supposed to indicate the great influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution not only on the anti-imperialist struggle in the rest of the world, but also on the world revolution. There were many foreign comments which described China as the centre of the world. Even though it was quite rare for Chinese leaders to openly praise China as the world leader, in December 1967, a "commentator" in *Renmin Ribao* wrote:

The hearts of the world's revolutionary people are turned to China, the centre of the world revolution. No force whatsoever can prevent the People's Republic of China from playing its great role and exerting its great influence in international affairs.²⁴⁴

This extract appears to have shown the CCP appealing to the nationalist sentiments of Chinese revolutionaries. At the same time, this seems to have indicated the CCP's confidence as one of the world powers.

As the CCP expected, Red Guards expressed pride that their country was the "centre of the world." Some of them mentioned that China had become the focus of international attention:

The hearts of the world's revolutionaries are turned to China, to Beijing, and to our most beloved great leader, Chairman Mao, [...].²⁴⁵

The establishment of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee in April 1967 was described as though it were the happiest thing to happen to the revolutionary people all over the world:

Beijing is the place where, regarding Chairman Mao as its head, the proletarian revolutionary headquarters is, and is the strong fortress of the international proletarian anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. The establishment of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee is a festival of the proletarian revolution of

²⁴³'Chinese people are marching towards bright future' in *PR* No.43, 25 October 1968, p.25.

²⁴⁴'China's great influence in the world is irresistible' in *RMRB*, 30 November 1967, translated in *PR* No.50, 8 December 1967, p.21.

²⁴⁵'Yi daju wei zhong, gao da tuanti zhuyi [Regard whole situation as important, carry on the great mass doctrine]' in *Dongfanghong*, 22 February 1967, p.5, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4057.

our country, and also is the happiest event of all the revolutionary people of the whole world.²⁴⁶

Another article said about the establishment of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee:

In the heroic capital of our great homeland, the heart of the world revolution, Beijing, a world-shaking spring thunder has risen [...].²⁴⁷

The Red Guards described Beijing as "'Yan'an' of the world revolution,"²⁴⁸ because Yan'an had been respected, mainly by the communists, as the original place and centre of the Chinese revolution where the communists set out in their war against the nationalists.

In addition, Red Guards also interviewed some "revolutionary" foreign residents in Beijing and printed their comments of praise in Red Guard papers. According to a Red Guard newspaper, *Waishi Hongqi*, an American resident in Beijing said:

The whole world's proletariat and revolutionary peoples are all gazing at China.²⁴⁹

The following extract showed "how the Red Guards were popular" among the revolutionary peoples of the world:

The revolutionary rebellious spirit of Red Guards shakes the whole world! Many silk banners and fresh flowers have been sent [... (from revolutionary places in the world) ...] and they express the world peoples' cherished desire: "Please pass our respects to the Chinese people and Red Guards, and tell them we will be standing together with them forever!"²⁵⁰

These expressions give an impression of China as the most important part of the world revolution. That was the image that the CCP wanted to impress Chinese revolutionaries with. It was also the image that many Chinese revolutionaries had of their country.

²⁴⁶'Guoji gongchan zhuyi yundong de xin kaige [A new song of triumph of the international communist movement]' in a combined issue by *Xin Beida* and *Renda Sanhong*, 20 April 1967, p.1, in *RGP* Vol.5, p.1415.

²⁴⁷'Hongse zhengquan wansui [Long live the red political power]' in a combined issue by *Xin Beida* and *Renda Sanhong*, 20 April 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.5, p.1415.

²⁴⁸'Wuchan jieji zhuanzheng de xin pianzhang [A new chapter of the proletarian dictatorship]' in a combined issue by *Xin Beida* and *Renda Sanhong*, 20 April 1967, p.2, in *RGP* Vol.5, p.1415.

²⁴⁹'Yu Zhongguo de wuchan jieji geming pai bingjian zhandou [Struggle together with Chinese proletarian revolutionaries]' in *Waishi Hongqi*, 8 May 1967, p.4, in *RGP* Vol.13, p.4397.

²⁵⁰'Qianjin! Yingxiong de hongweibing [Forward, heroic Red Guards!]' *Xin Beida*, 28 March 1967, p.4, in *RGP* Vol.5, p.1312.

This rhetorical strategy was not seen before the Cultural Revolution started. As we have seen in the early chapter, the CCP had previously tried not to give other countries the impression that China was wanting to claim itself as the leader of world revolution.

At an interview with Red Guards by Japanese Maoists at the round-table talk in Beijing, the Red Guards told the Japanese as follows:

The Cultural Revolution is a great revolution which is related to the destiny of the human beings of both China and the world. (Shi Wenjie, aged 21, Beijing Aeronautical Institution)²⁵¹

Red Guards act according to the teachings of Chairman Mao. They hold to the principles of persuasion and education, and convince others by talking reason. Last year, when Japanese friends came, to tell you the truth, I was anxious about their long hair. We were asked by some Japanese friends if it was OK to leave the long hair and long pants as they were. But we explained that it was a thing that they themselves should decide and that to defeat the "four olds"²⁵² was to exterminate capitalist and revisionist thoughts persistently. We said that the strange hairstyle was a sign of the rotten American life style and that the revolutionary people and hard workers would value simplicity above everything else. The Japanese friends were deeply impressed and said, "Indeed you are right." I heard that they had had a haircut soon after going home. (Zhu Aimin, aged 22, Beijing University)²⁵³

The above quote portrays the Red Guards as not giving orders to others. The above speaker claimed that what the Red Guards would do was to give others reasons and let the others make decisions by themselves. Although the speaker did not demonstrate any intention of impressing the Japanese Maoists with the Red Guard leadership, the quote indicates the speaker's pride in pursuing the revolution according to Mao Zedong Thought. The speaker's

²⁵¹'Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview Red Guards]' in *JC* No.5, 1967, p.81.

²⁵²Old thought, old culture, old custom and old tradition

²⁵³'Pekin ni sumu Nihon no yujin koeihei ni kiku [Japanese friends living in Beijing interview Red Guards]' in *JC* No.5, 1967, p.74.

implicit point in the statement seems to be that the Red Guards were the best revolutionaries in terms of having grasped Mao Zedong Thought correctly and putting it into practice faithfully. (However, there ~~is~~ ^{are} no materials for me to be sure about the speaker's point of view.)

Another Red Guard at the interview explained the Chinese point of view on the international role of the Cultural Revolution:

The Great Cultural Revolution's great significance is, I think, that not only did it expose a handful of the Party realists on the capitalist road; thoroughly criticise and dismantle the bourgeois reactionary line; uproot feudalism, capitalism and revisionism; promote Mao Zedong Thought, preventing China from ever changing its colours; but it also contributed greatly to the work of the international communist movement and the world revolution. (Liu Zhichang, aged 28, Qinghua University)²⁵⁴

The "betrayal" by the USSR was one thing that the CCP, through praising China as the world revolutionary leader, wanted to impress the rest of the world revolutionaries with. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was taken as proof that the USSR was no longer the leader of world socialism. The Chinese, introducing a statement from *Vanguard*, which they claimed was the "Organ of the Communist Party of Australia," alluded to China replacing the USSR as revolutionary leader:

The great victory of China's great proletarian cultural revolution [...] "stands in striking contrast to the dirty betrayal by the Soviet and Czech revisionist cliques of the dictatorship of the proletariat. While they go down in ignominy, the Chinese people hold up the great banner of Marxism-Leninism, the thought of Mao Tse-tung as never before."²⁵⁵

Thus Chinese leaders' rhetorical attempts to stimulate the revolutionaries to the Cultural Revolution were shown in the Chinese publications. Using foreigners' high praise for China was supposed to be even more effective to promote the "revolutionary spirit" of

²⁵⁴Ibid., p.82.

²⁵⁵'Inauguration of revolutionary committees throughout China hailed by friends abroad' in *PR* No.40, 4 October 1968, p.28.

the Chinese. The Red Guard pride was shown directly to the Japanese Maoists at the interview. For Chinese revolutionaries, the "fall" of the CPSU and "worldwide acclaim" towards the Cultural Revolution seemed to be the right "evidence" to believe that China had become the centre of the world revolution.

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to examine the account of China's place in the world in rhetoric in the 1960s. I argued that China's rhetorical strategies in the international struggles of anti-imperialism and "world revolution" were influenced by a developing CCP construction of an international image of China.

Firstly, it has been obvious that Red Guards, "the most devoted followers of Chairman Mao," were keen to export Mao Zedong Thought (Chapter Two). Although most Red Guard rhetoric followed that of the CCP, Red Guard revolutionary propaganda was generally more militant. According to the Red Guards, the world communist movement should be developed in accordance with Mao Zedong Thought. They believed themselves to be the model revolutionaries of the world. Some articles and speeches reveal the Red Guards' patriotic motivation for insisting on the export of Mao Zedong Thought.

Some Red Guards' patriotism was partly influenced by CCP rhetorical strategies that tried to stimulate the people's pride in pursuing anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist struggles in the forefront (Chapter Three). For example, Red Guard denunciations of the Soviet Union were largely influenced by the anti-revisionist line of the CCP rhetoric. Nationalism among those Red Guards and support for Mao's approach were linked, because Mao emphasised anti-imperialism as one of his defining ideas and characterising China as militantly anti-imperialist. Foreign praise of Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution might also have promoted some Red Guards' enthusiasm for the "revolution."

Secondly, there are clear contradictions within CCP rhetoric dealing with the idea of "world revolution." The CCP sought peaceful compromise with the "bourgeois" French government and "colonialist" Britain for reasons of security and interest. Compared to the CCP's harsh denunciations of imperialism and inflammatory words of encouragement to the "oppressed people" of the world, the CCP's neglect of the protest by the Somali people against the French government could be seen as a failure to live up to anti-imperialism. In the

same sense, the CCP's skilful policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the British government over Hong Kong throughout the 1960s could be called "revisionist". Even in the summer of 1967 when violent demonstrations by Chinese radicals against the British Chargé d'Affaires office in Beijing reached their peak, the CCP general line in relation to Hong Kong remained moderate. Indeed, CCP rhetoric developed in the direction of calming down the anti-colonialist movement.

Thirdly, the CCP reluctance to act also contradicted its militant rhetoric. This was discussed in the second section of chapter one when looking at Chinese reaction to the Vietnam War. In response to Soviet "revisionist" attitudes towards the United States over the Vietnam War, China emphasised its militancy against imperialism even more strongly. However, China did not act as militantly as it advocated. Beijing appeared to portray a revolutionary image of China through *rhetorical* struggle against US imperialism. This meant that China did not want actual war in pursuing its anti-imperialist policy, while it was insisting on thorough violent struggles against the enemy by local national liberation movements.

Fourthly, CCP revolutionary rhetoric throughout the 1960s revealed Chinese concern over the relationship with the Soviet Union. China regarded itself as a power that could challenge the Soviet leadership in the socialist camp. Beijing often tried to demonstrate its "orthodox" Marxism-Leninism by criticising Moscow's "betrayal," especially after 1964. In addition, China acted differently from the USSR -- for instance, China did not send its military troops abroad, while the Soviet Union did (Chapter One). It was also concerned with promoting an anti-Soviet united front around the world.

On the other hand, the CCP's confidence in developing its influence on "Third World" revolutions seemed to wane in the latter part of the 1960s. Maoist China's relative isolation in the world which it portrayed as divided between the forces of imperialism and revisionism was accompanied by militant rhetorical strategies (Chapter Three). To Beijing, Mao and Mao Zedong Thought were "revolutionary banners" which China could impress the rest of the world with.

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Appendix A

Chinese original texts of passages translated for this thesis

Footnote

No.50

苏美合作主宰世界，是赫鲁晓夫修正主义路线的灵魂。

No.49

犯下了世界外交史上罕见的滔天罪行，欠下了中国人民又一笔新的血债。

No.50

苏修这只纸老虎一经戳穿，就变成一钱不值的狗屎堆。

No.51

这一切“气壮如牛”的举动，却恰恰暴露了苏修混蛋是一群见不得阳光的丑类！

No.88

毛主席：我们有各种朋友，你们[...]是朋友的一种。同时在北京访问的印度尼西亚共产党主席艾地，也是我们的朋友[...]。我们同艾地有共同点，同你们也有共同点。

马尔罗：这些共同点是不一样的。

毛主席：有一点是一样的，例如如何对付美帝国主义，对付英国的两面派。[...]

No.112

尤其近百年来，英帝霸占了我香港之后，把香港变成了黑暗的人间地狱。[...]。报新仇，雪旧恨，打倒英帝主义！

No.124

你穿上这套衣服去印尼与苏加诺勾搭，丢尽了中国人民的脸，你侮辱了全中国人民。

No.129

陈毅还有一点稍微的无产阶级的原则性和民族自尊心吗？

No.139

我们伟大的导师，伟大的领袖，伟大的统帅，伟大的舵手毛主席，是当代最伟大的马克思列宁主义者。毛主席天才地，创造性地，全面地继承，捍卫和发展了马克思列宁主义，把马克思列宁主义提高到一个崭新的阶段。

No.141

无产阶级必须用暴力革命打碎旧的国家机器，代之以无产阶级专政。但是，无产阶级在取得政权以后如何保持和巩固无产阶级专政，防止资产阶级复辟，把社会主义革命进行到底，这个问题是所有前辈的马克思列宁主义者都没有来得及解决或者没有能够解决，而由当代最伟大的马克思列宁主义者，我们伟大的领袖毛主席解决了，[...]

No.142

把马克思列宁主义，毛泽东思想灌输到群众中去，[...]

No.145

马克思列宁主义的本质是批判的，革命的。它的基本点是要批判，要斗争，要革命。

No.146

你是革命者，你是马克思列宁主义者，你就必然拥护伟大领袖毛主席，拥护战无不胜的毛泽东思想；[...]

No.154

毛主席和我握过手，你们快来和我握手！

No.155

还有个代表团员到过韶山，特地包了一包毛主席家乡的土带回来作纪念。

No.156

英雄的越南人民把毛主席象章看得比什么都珍贵，比什么都重要。冬季的一天，海防港口工人正在紧张地工作着。忽然一位华侨工人不小心把一枚毛主席象章掉进海水里去了。这时只见有一位越南老工人衣服也没来得及脱就“扑通”一声跳进冰冷的海水中。他第一次扎进水底没有捞到，就浮到水面换了口气又扎到水底。这样上下三次才把这枚金光闪闪的毛主席象章捞了上来。等他上岸后，全身冻得已经发了紫，但是他还吃力地对其他工人讲：“毛主席是全世界人民的领袖，我热爱他！”

No.157

什么？是你们的毛主席？不！毛主席不只是你们的，也是我们全世界人民的！

No.158

中国的红太阳升起来了！中国出了一个毛泽东，毛泽东思想和中国革命的具体实践结合起来了，因此在中国，这一个地球上的大国革命就成功了，[...]

No.160

今日亚洲的东方，驰名的长江南北，古老的黄河上下，燃烧着一把熊熊的火炬，她是全人类的希望，各国人民革命斗争的灯塔！她，就是光焰天际的毛泽东思想！

No.169

毛泽东思想不仅属于中国，而且属于世界人民，它是打倒美帝国主义，粉碎现代修正主义的巨大力量，是世界人民的强有力的哲学理论武器。

No.171

我国人民一刻也不能离开毛泽东思想，就象不能离开粮食和空气一样。

No.174

这个毛泽东思想是地地道道的中国货，我们不要拿到外国去。

No.175

谢胡同志去年访问中国回国后，在一次会议上讲：“我们阿尔巴尼亚人民都无限热爱毛主席，我们每一个阿尔巴尼亚人民都愿意从自己的年令中抽出几岁给毛主席，祝毛主席万寿天疆！”

No.191

宫本显治之流一而再，再而三地攻击我国红卫兵，歪曲中日两党会谈情况，发表反华言论，公然污蔑我们红卫兵心中最红最红的红太阳毛主席。[...]。宫本显治一伙混蛋们，你们竖起狗耳听着，谁反对毛主席，就打倒谁！我们要把铁拳伸到东京，砸烂你们的狗头！[...]。反帝必反修。我们就是要反对苏联修正主义！打倒勃列日涅夫！砸烂柯西金的狗头！你们不舒服吗？！打在苏修的身上，痛在你们的心上！好一对双胞胎！宫本显治，无耻！可悲！不要脸！

No.192

暴力革命和武装斗争对他们来说又是何等的可怕！他们大喊什么反对“盲从主义”，“教条主义”，说穿了就是一句话：抵制日本人民掌握马列主义，毛泽东思想，从而把日本人民革命纳入修正主义的轨道。他们已经堕落成只想“资产阶级统治下获得大多数选票”的“叛徒”，“腐儒”！

No.194

来了！七十高龄的德田球一夫人[...], 容光焕发, 挥动红彤彤的<毛主席语录>, 稳步登上了主席台。“起来, 饥寒交迫的奴隶！起来, 全世界受苦的人！满腔的热血已经沸腾[...].” [...] 横川次郎作了精采的讲演, 他热情洋溢地歌颂伟大的毛泽东思想, 称赞中国的文化大革命和红卫兵, 给每个红旗战士上了一堂极其生动, 形象的政治课。[...]。红旗战士代表说得好: “虽然我们语言不同, 国籍不同, 但是, 我们的心脏, 是为着同一个目的而跳动, 这就是——在世界实现共产主义！” [...] 红旗战士给日本朋友戴上了光芒四射的毛主席像纪念章和经过战斗洗礼的红旗袖章。

No.195

日本人民在斗争中深深地体会到毛泽东思想的伟大意义。他们组织了许多毛主席著作学习小组, 研究会。他们最爱读毛主席的书, 他们最热爱毛主席。

No.210

“十月革命”和中国革命的胜利, 开辟了无产阶级和其它劳动人民暴力夺取政权的新纪元。“枪杆子里面出政权”。这给全世界未解放的被压迫人民和被压迫民族的夺权斗争树立了光辉的榜样, 指明了前进的方向。

No.245

世界革命人民心向中国, 心向北京, 心向我们最最敬爱的伟大领袖毛主席, [...].

No.246

北京, 是以毛主席为首的无产阶级革命司令部的所在地, 是国际无产阶级反帝反修的坚强堡垒。北京市革命委员会的成立, 是我国无产阶级革命的盛大节日, 也是全世界一切革命人民的大喜事。

No.247

在我们伟大祖国的英雄首都, 世界革命的心脏——北京, 又一次传出了震撼世界的春雷[...].

No.249

全世界的无产阶级和革命人民都在望着中国。

No.250

红卫兵的革命造反精神, 震撼全世界！[...] 寄来了多少锦旗和鲜花, 表达了世界人民的心愿: “请向中国人民和红卫兵转达我们的敬意, 告诉他们, 我们永远同他们站在一起！”

Appendix B

Japanese original texts of passages translated for this thesis

No.178

私たちは毛主席の思想によって、妖怪変化と戦い、全中国、世界人民のためにたたかうんです。

No.179

ぼくたち紅衛兵は、毛主席の偉大な理想---全世界に共産主義社会をうちたてるために奮闘しているのです。

No.196

わたしたち紅衛兵は、日本人民の革命闘争に大きな関心をよせています。わたしたちは永遠に日本人民の側にたち、日本人民の反米愛国闘争と修正主義反対の闘争をあくまでも支持します。

No.197

全世界が大激動、大分化、大再編をたどっているなかで、ぼくらは日本人民、世界人民と団結し、世界革命の新しい勝利をめざして、帝国主義、修正主義、各国反動派とあくまでたたかい、世界革命の新しい勝利を勝ちとらなければなりません。

No.198

(旅券闘争を積極的に闘ってきた人も、闘わないできた人も、) みんな一致団結しなければいけません。あなたたちの中国訪問を妨げたのは、だれだったのでしょうか? あなたたちはよく知っているでしょう。その妨害者と闘うために、みんなは団結しなければなりません。

No.251

文化大革命は中国と世界の人類の運命にかかわる偉大な革命です。

No.253

紅衛兵は毛主席の教えに従って行動し、説得と教育の原則を守って、道理を説いてほかの人を納得させています。昨年、日本の友人がこられたのですが、正直なところを言えば、日本の方の長い髪を見て気になったのです。こんな髪やズボンでは切らなくてもいいのかと日本の友人に聞かれました。だが、わたしたちは、それはあなた自身が決めることだ、と説明しました。変てこなヘアスタイルはくさりきったアメリカの生活様式の現われで、革命的人民や勤労者は質素をもっと重んじるのですと言うと、日本の方もすっかり感動して、「たしかにそうですね」と言っておられました。帰ってからすぐに髪をみじかく切ってしまったそうです。

No.254

文化大革命の意義は、資本主義の道を歩む党内のひとにぎりの実権派をつまみ出し、ブルジョア反動路線を徹底的に批判して、うち倒し、封建主義、資本主義、修正主義を根こそぎにし、毛沢東思想を大いにうち立て、中国を永久に変色させないということだけでなく、国際共産主義運動と世界革命の事業にも大きな貢献をなしていると思います。